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ABSTRACT
Constitutionalists believe that the Equal Protection Clause died
during the early decades of the twentieth century. We aim to correct the
record on this claim and, in the process, demonstrate equality’s longheld aspirations to political theory. Decades before Professor John
Hart Ely and public choice, equal protection aspired to be a principle
of governance as much as a principle of classification or
discrimination. This tradition was not limited as is modern equality law
to race, sex, or even caste, but aimed to tie equality to the duties of
representatives to govern for all, not simply for some. This Article
argues that early twentieth-century equal protection law strove in
imperfect ways for a theory of abusive representation; it naïvely hoped
that the generality of legislation could bind majorities to minorities. To
resurrect and articulate an analogous modern theory would require far
more than law-office history; it would require fleshing out what the old
theory of equality failed to do: to construct a convergence-forcing
method that would tie the fate of legislative majorities to that of
minorities. In that spirit, we offer a proposal that emphasizes (à la the
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new governance literature) the power of “embedded constitutionalism,”
a proposal that combats abusive representation by forcing the active
consideration and deliberation of constitutional values in more
powerful institutions—in this case, legislatures.
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INTRODUCTION
It is one of the great historical tropes of constitutionalists that the
Equal Protection Clause died in the late-nineteenth century. If what
one means by that claim is that the Equal Protection Clause afforded
little protection to groups now protected, that is correct. But it is
wrong to believe that the idea of equal protection was moribund in
1
the early part of the twentieth century. Too many constitutionalists,
1. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, Equal Protection of the Laws, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 357, 358
(1974); Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 48
(1972) (citing Buck’s “usual last resort” proposition as true of an earlier day); Philip P. Kurland,
Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MICH. L. REV. 629, 638 (1970) (same). This is also the
message of the most influential equal protection article of the twentieth century. See Joseph
Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 341
(1949) (stating in the first paragraph that the Equal Protection Clause had suffered “eighty
years of relative desuetude” and quoting Holmes’s statement for support). This view remains an
assumption of those who engage constitutional history, see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 119 (1991); Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal
Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 214 (1991) (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395
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have fallen for the pithy saying of Justice Holmes who, in the
2
infamous Buck v. Bell decision of 1927, wrote that the “equal
3
protection clause” was the “last resort” of the constitutional lawyer.
In this Article, we correct the record that Justice Holmes’s
aphorism obscures and show that a constitutional common law of
equal protection existed in the early part of the twentieth century. In
correcting the historical record, we do not aim to resurrect an
enchanted past. The equal protection law of the early decades of the
twentieth century is, from a modern perspective, a tragedy: the law
repeatedly avowed its commitment to equality in a world that mocked
4
its realization. But legal history seeks not only to judge the past but
also to reveal the present. Even tragedies present learning
opportunities if they suggest a different way of addressing old
5
problems. History is an important tool for criticizing and
destabilizing intellectual dependence on concepts born in the present.
This truism is particularly important here as the history of equality
examined in this Article is intertwined with the history of substantive
due process, a highly controversial doctrine associated with judicial
activism because it strikes down state laws as violating substantive
6
rather than procedural rights.
This Article uses history to challenge modern constitutionalists’
ideas of equality, teasing out a strain of thought that once struggled to
reflect notions of political theory and governance. In Part I, we
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); (Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)), as well as those simply
considering modern issues, see Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1491, 1493 n.8 (2002) (citing Buck for the proposition that equal protection was once the
“last resort” of equality arguments); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 481, 494 (2004) (same).
2. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927) (upholding the constitutionality of forced
sterilization).
3. Id. at 208.
4. In a sense this should not be surprising, as the structure of litigation tends to prefer the
repeat play of the “haves.” See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 123 n.72 (1974).
5. Precedent requires lawyers to look for the present in the past in the following sense:
lawyers are taught to look for cases “on point.” In the case of equal protection, lawyers look for
cases involving modern problems of sex, race, and gay rights, and finding nothing, conclude that
there is no law of equal protection. History, in our view, is essential to disrupt this precedential
fallacy. For a demonstration of just how relentlessly presentist the modern system of precedent
is and how it requires reading the present into the past, see VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS
HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS 15–16,
151–52 (2008).
6. Gunther, supra note 1, at 42 (equating substantive due process with the “repulsive
connotation” of value-based judicial review).
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document the lost history of equal protection in federal and state
courts, focusing on two conflicting ideals—one of classification and
the other of governance—demonstrating that the Equal Protection
Clause was not moribund during these decades. In Part II, we use this
history to challenge three scholarly truisms: first, the basic doctrinal
notion that equal protection has always been about classification
simpliciter; second, the idea that representational or political-process
theories are modern, post–World War II ideas; and third, the more
recent claim by historians that the early law of equal protection
resolves the Lochner substantive due process problem. Each of these
claims, we argue, is incorrect.
In Part III, we urge that the history of equal protection invites
the reader to imagine the possibility of a postidentity, postformal
equality law based on a robust theory of political representation. We
evaluate recent attempts by some scholars and courts to revive a
version of the equal protection law from this period known as “class
7
legislation.” We argue that simply transferring the old doctrine of
class legislation to the present will fail if scholars and judges do not
articulate a sustained theory of equal governance. In Part IV, we
conclude by suggesting that, in its ideal state, equal governance
requires a convergence-forcing mechanism—one which catalyzes
legislative rather than judicial action. Drawing from corporate and
agency law, we argue that the state should embrace its duty to protect
minority interests. We show in this Part that a governance theory of
equality may generate new solutions to old problems, such as
Congress’s decades-long refusal to address gross racial disparities
8
between crack and powder cocaine penalties.

7. Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56
EMORY L.J. 843, 855 (2007) (“[L]imits on abortion are a form of class legislation . . . .”); Melissa
L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Color Blindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245,
334 (1997) (suggesting that class legislation can aid resolving voting rights cases); see also Mark
G. Yudof, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Sex Discrimination: One Small Cheer for Mr.
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1366, 1387 (1990) (exploring “the idea that
the historical concept of equal protection, rooted in the nineteenth-century commitment to
equality under law and animus to class legislation, is fully applicable to discrimination on the
basis of sex”).
8. While this Article was in press, Congress did make changes to the crack cocaine
penalties, but after more than a decade of calls to change the rules by commentators and the
Sentencing Commission. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xiv (1995), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/crack/execsum.pdf (recommending revision of the “100-to-1” sentencing
disparity between crack and powder cocaine); David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1306–11 (1995).
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I. TWO STRANDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION
The history of equal protection law from the late-nineteenth
century until the mid-twentieth century has largely been lost. In part,
this is because legal scholarship is relentlessly normative and the cases
of yesteryear disappoint normative expectations: modern scholarship
looks back with disdain at the thin veil of legal equality that
rationalized massive racial segregation and the political exclusion of
over half the population (women)—and yet pronounced itself
9
devoted to equality. From the perspective of the present, the equality
law of old was a tragedy of formalism: the law proclaimed its
faithfulness to equality openly and often but did nothing to attack
massive and real inequalities of race and sex. Given this well-known
tragedy, it is tempting to believe that Justice Holmes was correct
when he pronounced equality’s death. But Holmes was wrong: equal
protection doctrine was not dead in 1927 when he claimed it was the
10
“usual last resort” of the constitutional lawyer. As close attention to
11
his words suggests, it was a “usual” argument, a frequent claim in the
first three decades of the twentieth century, and its history is
intertwined with a doctrine largely forgotten—a doctrine called “class
legislation.”
Constitutionalists have forgotten the “old” equal protection law
at least in part because contemporary equality doctrine is relentlessly
traitist, a kind of adjective law that limits its ideal of equality to
12
characteristics, such as sex and race, of individuals and groups. This
history shows that equality was not always imagined as false
stereotype or group generalization; instead, it was an ideal of
democratic governance, an ideal that aimed to honor laws only when
they joined the haves and have-nots within the legislative process.
This tradition has been obscured by the fact that many of the cases
9. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (upholding “separate but equal”
laws); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (upholding the disfranchisement
of women); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137–39 (1872) (upholding a state law
prohibiting women from practicing law).
10. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
11. Id.
12. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (racial classifications); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (racial classifications); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 531 (1996) (gender classifications); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 445–46 (1985) (denying heightened scrutiny for a classification of the mentally
handicapped); see also Brown, supra note 1, at 1500–05 (discussing the Supreme Court’s
approach toward “issues of unequal treatment on the basis of race or other group
characteristics” and “protection of liberty”).
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espousing the ideal arose in what are normatively unexpected and
unattractive situations: equal protection arguments were used as
often as a sword to sustain privilege as a shield against oppression. In
our haste to distance ourselves from equality’s tragic past, however,
we have lost something in the translation: we have lost an inchoate
strand of thought which aimed, but failed, to articulate equality as
more than formal classification, as a theory of governance.
During the great heyday of what is known as laissez-faire
13
constitutionalism, equal protection was often wielded by powerful
corporations. By contrast, in the post–World War II world, equality is
associated with powerless minorities. But law’s ideals are often used
for purposes antithetical to its aspirations. The important point is not,
then, the doctrine’s results; the point is its intellectual content and
14
aspiration. For if this history is correct, equality once dealt with class
and governance in ways thought impossible by contemporary
constitutionalists.
The first thing to appreciate is that there was a history of equal
protection from 1880 until 1937, even though so many

13. This term is not necessarily an accurate description. It was widely believed by the runof-the-mine scholar of the early twentieth century that the laissez-faire period was limited to the
nineteenth century. Professor Charles Burdick, for example, wrote,
Until the latter part of the nineteenth century the public mind was suspicious of
governmental encroachment, hostile to governmental regulation, and bent upon the
preservation of the largest possible degree of individual freedom. . . . [T]he opinions
of the Supreme Court . . . have in recent years shown a change of emphasis, as a result
of which the constitutional limitations upon state action have been liberally construed
in favor of a wide power of governmental control.
CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT § 196, at 469 (1922). Scholars and historians know that the laissez-faire
aspiration is one that each generation aims to reimagine. For the widespread presence of law
and regulation in the nineteenth century, see generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S
WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). Even
students and seeming advocates of the Lochner era know that, until the 1920s, the Court
consistently upheld regulation. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 62–63 (2003) (recognizing that there were discontinuities in this period).
14. It is hornbook constitutional law that class or wealth is not a characteristic that triggers
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 374 (1996) (“[W]ealth discrimination alone
[does not] provid[e] an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny . . . .” (first alteration added)
(quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973))). In fact, the Court
has struck down laws involving wealth discrimination in some contexts. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (holding that a statutory prohibition of welfare benefits to
residents of less than a year was unconstitutional); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956)
(striking down legislation that denied indigents free trial transcripts); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding unconstitutional a statute that sterilized chicken thieves but not
embezzlers).
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constitutionalists have written that there is no history. In fact, one
might argue that, during this period, equality was at least as
16
doctrinally important, and controversial, as substantive due process.
To give one a rather crude empirical measure of this phenomenon,
test the relative use of the term “equal protection” and that of the
terms most conventionally associated with this period of law—“right
to property” or “right to contract”—and one will actually come up
with more references to equal protection. From 1900 through 1930—a
period when equal protection is thought to have died in the Supreme
Court—approximately 100 cases referred to “right to property” or
17
“right to contract,” and 745 referred to “equal protection.” Indeed,
close reading reveals that decisions now known for completely
18
unrelated principles, including Lochner v. New York, Muller v.

15. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
16. We recognize that, for some historians, the term “substantive due process” is
anachronistic. It is true, as Professor G. Edward White has shown, that this term was not used
during the Lochner period in the caselaw. G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process
and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 88–89 (1997). The absence of a particular
term should not, however, obscure the fact that there was a good deal of discussion during this
period about whether the Due Process Clause addressed not only “procedure but also . . .
substantive law.” Robert P. Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and “the Substance of Individual
Rights,” 58 U. PA. L. REV. & AM. L. REG. 191, 191 (1910).
17. LEXIS, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition, search between January 1, 1900,
and December 31, 1930, with the terms “right to property” or “right to contract.” The disparity
was not as extreme in the state courts. In the state court database for this same period, for
example, 2,196 cases referred to “right to property” or “right to contract,” 1,371 referred to
“class legislation,” and over three thousand referred to “equal protection.” LEXIS, State Court
Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1930, with the terms:
“right to property” and “right to contract”; “class legislation”; and “equal protection.” One
caveat is important here: although the terms “right to property” and “right to contract” are the
terms one uses today to view the Lochner period, these terms were not always expressed in this
fashion, and so this set of numbers may undercount the number of cases that dealt with property
or contract in some way. Our point is not to fetishize a particular number; it is to emphasize that
equal protection was a far more common argument than is typically imagined.
18. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54–55 (1905). Lochner has come to be known as a
case about the right to liberty or contract, not equal protection, but was argued as a case about
class legislation. For a sustained argument on the importance of class legislation to Lochner, see
White, supra note 16, at 97. For the conventional account focusing on the right to contract, see
Stewart Jay, The Creation of the First Amendment Right to Free Expression: From the Eighteenth
Century to the Mid-Twentieth Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 773, 824–25 (2008) (“This
period was high noon for freedom of contract under the regime of Lochner v. New York.”); J.
Harvie Wilkinson III, Toward One America: A Vision in Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 325
(2008) (“Lochner v. New York advanced the notion of a personal freedom of contract as part of
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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20

Oregon, and Whitney v. California, were once argued at least in
part as equal protection cases.
To be sure, far more equal protection claims failed than
succeeded, yet they were successful enough of the time that the
arguments did not die. During the first decades of the twentieth
century, two conflicting strands of thought informed equal protection.
One strand we call the “textualist” strand, focusing on classification.
Under the lingua franca of the police power, the courts affirmed the
right, and indeed the necessity, of classification. Ultimately, this
21
would become the core of modern equal protection law.
The other strand of equal protection, a strand called “class
legislation,” was not limited to classification simpliciter. Legislative
generality was its touchstone. The constitutionalist Justice Cooley, the
intellectual patron saint of this doctrine, explained,
[E]very one has a right to demand that he be governed by general
rules . . . . Those who make the laws “are to govern by promulgated,
established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one
rule for rich and poor, for the favorite at court and the countryman
22
at the plough.”

19. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908). Muller is known for its use of the so-called
Brandeis brief written by future Justice Louis Brandeis on actual labor conditions, not equal
protection. See id. at 419 & n.1.
20. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 369–70 (1927). The Whitney case upheld the
application of California’s criminal syndicalism law to a member of the Communist Party. Id. at
372. The case is most remembered for Justice Brandeis’s passionate defense of free speech in his
concurring opinion:
They [the Founders] believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of noxious
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people; that public
discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.
Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). See generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the
Ideal of Civil Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 653 (1988) (offering historical background on the Whitney case).
21. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 343. For a critique of this textualist strand of
thought, see infra Part IV.
22. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 559 (Boston,
Little, Brown, & Co., 7th ed. 1903) (1868) (quotation error in original) (quoting JOHN LOCKE,
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, rev. ed.
1988) (1690)).
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These arguments predated the Fourteenth Amendment and in
part legitimated civil rights reforms. One of the more important post–
Civil War arguments against the Black Codes was that they created a
special class of persons and thus violated the rule against class
23
legislation. The idea lived on long past the Fourteenth Amendment.
As University of Chicago Professor Ernst Freund would explain in
1904, constitutional equality required a “general public law binding
upon all the members of the community, and not partial or private
laws affecting the rights of private individuals or classes of
24
individuals.”
As a number of historians and legal commentators have shown,
the class-legislation ideal emerging in the post–Civil War period had
25
ancient roots. The colonists brought with them from England the
notion of the “common” wealth, an idea aimed to resist the king’s
grant of special favors and monopolies. John Locke’s Second Treatise,
which was highly influential in America, declared that there should be
“one Rule for Rich and Poor, for the Favourite at Court, and the
26
Country Man at Plough.” Not surprisingly, new state constitutions
incorporated these ideas, declaring that government was instituted
“for the common benefit, protection and security of the people . . .
and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man,
27
family, or sett of men, who are a part only of that community.”
The idea lived on through the early Republic. Jeffersonian
Republicans resisted the Federalists on the ground that they were
granting legislative benefits to the few; the Jeffersonians made
“‘equal rights for all, special privileges for none’ a central plank of
23. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 43–44 (1988) (reporting that Northerners objected to the
Black Codes in part out of fear “that if the South were ‘reconstructed upon the principle that
the rights of any class . . . depended upon race or color, we may well expect that the two
opposite principles will produce constant agitation and struggle for supremacy, until it
culminates in a resort to arms’” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Collins Denny, Jr., The
Growth and Development of the Police Power of the State, 20 MICH. L. REV. 173, 189 (1921).
24. ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
§ 611, at 633 (1904).
25. For documentation of this history, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION
BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 22–33
(1993); NELSON, supra note 23, at 176–77; Saunders, supra note 7, at 255–58.
26. LOCKE, supra note 22, at 363. Justice Cooley would later use Locke’s phrase in his own
treatise. See supra text accompanying note 22.
27. PA. CONST. of 1776, art. V (Decl. of Rights), reprinted in 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS
OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 278 (William F. Swindler ed., 1979); see also, e.g., VT.
CONST. of 1777, art. VI (adopting language identical to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776).
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28

their platform.” This philosophy would reach its height at the
creation of the modern Democratic Party, which was founded on
Andrew Jackson’s insistence that government should “shower its
29
favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor.” The
emergence of a legal doctrine reflecting these sentiments was one of
30
“the chief constitutional development[s] of pre-Civil War America.”
As one editorialist explained in 1834, “[A]ll acts of partial
legislation are undemocratic . . . and, in their final operation, build up
a powerful aristocracy, and overthrow the whole frame of democratic
31
government.” Relying on “law of the land” clauses in their state
constitutions, state courts developed doctrinal rules striking down
laws that were not “general and public” and that did not “operat[e]
32
equally on every individual in the community.” As one court
explained the rule of generality, “[T]he minority are safe, [if] the
majority, who make the law, are operated on by it equally with the
33
others.” The tradition would live on after the Civil War: as the
Michigan Supreme Court would put it in 1870, “[t]he State can have
no favorites,” for its business is “to give all the benefit of equal laws”

28. Michael Les Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293, 318 (1985).
29. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: 1789–1897, at 1139, 1153 (James D. Richardson
ed., 1896).
30. Yudof, supra note 7, at 1375 (citing F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 188
(1960)).
31. William Leggett, Editorial, Monopolies, N.Y. EVENING POST, Nov. 29, 1834, reprinted
in 1 WILLIAM LEGGETT, A COLLECTION OF THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF WILLIAM LEGGETT
83, 85 (Theodore Sedgwick, Jr., ed., New York, Taylor & Dodd, 1840). See generally Alan
Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: A Reconsideration, 53 J. AM.
HIST. 751 (1967) (discussing Justice Cooley’s views on partial legislation).
32. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 605 (1831). Other leading cases
include: Regents v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838); Holden v. James, 11 Mass. (11
Tyng) 396, 402 (1814); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 554, 555 (1831); Vanzant v.
Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829) (Catron, J., concurring); Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121,
123 (Vt. 1825). For a discussion of the early cases, see RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS OF
LAW: A HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL TREATISE OF THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS
FOLLOWED BY THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE “LAW OF THE
LAND” 256–74 (1926).
33. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 606; see also Ward, 1 Aik. at 123. In Ward, counsel argued,
“If the legislature have power to select any individual, as the object of particular legislation, and
exempt him from obligations to which all others are subject, it may be the instrument of the
grossest favouritism; or, in times of political excitement, of the most cruel persecution.” Id.
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and not “make discriminations in favor of one class against
34
another.”
We call this the “governance” model of equal protection because
it looks beyond anticlassification and antidiscrimination simpliciter
and imagines unequal laws as violating fundamental governmental
35
premises and democratic aspirations. The idea is not simply that the
law has misclassified or used spurious generalizations (modern
notions of equality); the idea is that general laws are superior to
special ones because of what they do within the legislative process—
they link representatives to those they represent. Those who legislate
generally find themselves the subjects of the law they impose and are
far less likely to oppress when they risk the law’s application along
with everyone else. If the many must legislate not only for themselves
but also for the few, their fates are linked; special laws, on the other
hand, raise the specter of aristocracy, a rule of the courtier over the
countryman.
Generality is in this sense an “embedded egalitarianism” (a form
36
of “embedded constitutionalism” ) that aims to resist simultaneously
the excesses of majorities and minorities by prophylactically aligning
their interests in the legislative process. It may seem naïve or even
fallacious to believe that a doctrinal standard could achieve such an
effect, but what drove class legislation was an inchoate and often

34. People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Twp. Bd., 20 Mich. 452, 486–87 (1870); see
also, e.g., Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252, 255–57 (C.C.D. Cal. 1879) (striking down special
legislation against aliens); Ex parte Westerfield, 55 Cal. 550, 551 (1880) (en banc) (striking down
a Sunday law); Lombard v. Antioch Coll., 19 N.W. 367, 370 (Wis. 1884) (rejecting a classlegislation argument); BRITTON A. HILL, LIBERTY AND LAW, OR, OUTLINES OF A NEW SYSTEM
FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERATIVE GOVERNMENT vi (St. Louis,
G.I. Jones and Co., 2d rev. ed. 1880) (decrying the “tyrannies of money-power, of monopolies,
and of class legislation”).
35. One might argue that both standards address governance. The principal distinction we
are making here is between a standard that focuses on the textual virtues of logical symmetry
and a standard that focuses outside the judiciary to concern itself with the legislature and with
judicial-legislative interaction.
36. Embedded constitutionalism refers to a constitutionalism that is maintained not by
judicial action but by institutions other than the courts. The term was first used, we believe, by
Professors Joanne Scott and Jane Holder in their article Law and New Environmental
Governance in the European Union. Joanne Scott & Jane Holder, Law and New Environmental
Governance in the European Union, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US
210, 238–39 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006). Professor Anuj Desai has argued
that the First Amendment sustained itself in early America because the post office adopted, in
essence, First Amendment values, thus embedding the amendment within an institution other
than the courts. Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of
Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557 (2008).
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poorly expressed democratic theory—a theory which might be
described as one of the “forced convergence” of majorities and
37
minorities. To enunciate this theory is not, we emphasize, to suggest
that it was successful as a judicial standard; indeed, the history of class
legislation reflects equality’s use as a sword to protect privilege as
much as a shield to reverse oppression. But before the idea can be
evaluated, it must be remembered, which is where we now turn.
A. The Equality Canon before Lochner
Any understanding of the equality law of the early twentieth
century must begin with a triad of late-nineteenth-century cases that
38
39
40
formed a kind of canon : Barbier v. Connolly, Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
41
and Holden v. Hardy. We consider each of these cases in turn to
show the limits and purposes of the doctrine.
Barbier announced the classic statement of the basic equal
protection principle: “Class legislation, discriminating against some
and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying
out a public purpose, is limited in its application” may withstand
42
scrutiny. This statement merely summarized ideas that could be
43
found littered throughout the pages of federal and, even more

37. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
38. In the text, we have emphasized U.S. Supreme Court decisions, but as the footnotes
demonstrate, the doctrine of class legislation was widely accepted throughout the United States
in state courts.
39. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1884).
40. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
41. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
42. Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32.
43. Many federal cases during this period invoked the class-legislation principle. E.g., Gulf,
Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155–56 (1897) (“The differences which will
support class legislation must be such as in the nature of things furnish a reasonable basis for
separate laws and regulations.” (quoting State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 351 (Mo. 1893)));
Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 390 (1894) (citing and applying Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32);
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 39 (1892) (describing class legislation as “[t]he inhibition that
no State shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws” and
explaining that it was “designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out
as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation”); Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co.
v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 29–30 (1889) (citing and applying Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); Hayes v.
Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 72 (1887) (same); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (“What is
called class legislation would belong to this category, and would be obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
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44

insistently, state reporters. Justice Cooley’s treatise, Constitutional
Limitations, was repeatedly cited as the source of this claim. “[E]very
one has a right to demand that he be governed by general rules,”
wrote Cooley:
[A] special statute which, without his consent, singles his case out as
one to be regulated by a different law from that which is applied in
all similar cases, would not be legitimate legislation, but would be
such an arbitrary mandate as is not within the province of free
45
governments.

As one court explained, the “legislature has no right to deprive
one class of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like
conditions”—the “law of the land” is a “general public law, binding
46
upon all the members of the community.” “Class legislation,
founded upon any distinctions of rank or wealth, is contrary to the
47
genius of our institutions.”
The idea was to distinguish between legislation for the common
benefit and legislation that benefited or burdened the few. The notion
of common benefit and generality was more, however, than simply a

44. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Roberts & Son, 27 So. 327, 332 (Ala. 1899) (quoting Barbier, 113
U.S. at 32); In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071, 1081–82 (Colo. 1899) (“The legislature has no right to
deprive one class of persons of privileges allowed to other persons under like conditions.”
(quoting Ritchie v. People, 40 N.E. 454, 456 (Ill. 1895))); Ritchie, 40 N.E. at 456 (“The ‘law of
the land’ is ‘general public law, binding upon all the members of the community, under all
circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private individuals, or
classes of individuals.’” (quoting Millett v. People, 7 N.E. 631, 633 (Ill. 1886))); State v. Haun, 59
P. 340, 344 (Kan. 1899) (“The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule of
law . . . .” (quoting State v. Goodwill, 10 S.E. 285, 286 (W. Va. 1889))); Leavitt v. Canadian Pac.
Ry. Co., 37 A. 886, 887–88 (Me. 1897) (quoting Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); Messenger v. Teagan,
64 N.W. 499, 501 (Mich. 1895) (same); People v. Bellett, 57 N.W. 1094, 1094 (Mich. 1894) (“By
class legislation, we understand such legislation as denies rights to one which are accorded to
others, or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another, in
like case, offending.”); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 364 (Neb. 1894) (quoting
COOLEY, supra note 22, on class legislation); Brim v. Jones, 39 P. 825, 826 (Utah 1895) (quoting
Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); Va. Dev. Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 17 S.E. 806, 807–08 (Va. 1893)
(rejecting a class-legislation challenge because Barbier allows class legislation that falls within
the police power); Peel Splint Coal Co. v. State, 15 S.E. 1000, 1005 (W. Va. 1892) (“Class
legislation, founded upon any distinctions of rank or wealth, is contrary to the genius of our
institutions.”); Goodwill, 10 S.E. at 286 (“[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24)); Bittenhaus v. Johnston, 66 N.W. 805, 806 (Wis. 1896)
(quoting Barbier, 113 U.S. at 32); In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1106–07 (Wis. 1893) (same).
45. COOLEY, supra note 22, at 391–92.
46. Ritchie, 40 N.E. at 456 (quoting Millett, 7 N.E. at 633).
47. Peel Splint Coal Co., 15 S.E. at 1005.
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question of textual classification or public value. It was an appeal to
notions of reciprocity in governance: law’s generality was important,
not simply in a formal sense, but because it forced lawmakers to stand
in the shoes of those they represented. The principle of class
legislation was terraced in both directions—it not only aimed to
prevent class privilege but also invidious oppression:
The rights of every individual must stand or fall by the same rule of
law that governs every other member of the body politic under
similar circumstances . . . . Were it otherwise, odious individuals or
corporate bodies would be governed by one law, and the mass of the
48
community, and those who make the law, by another.

Barbier v. Connolly may have been the case most cited for
49
rejecting legislative class favoritism, but this was not because of its
holding. The claim in Barbier was that San Franciscans were targeting
50
the Chinese with an ordinance that prohibited nighttime laundering.
The claim failed because the Court found no discrimination: the law
was “general” and did not apply only to the Chinese.
A different result would soon appear in the next class-legislation
decision, Yick Wo v. Hopkins. Yick Wo has come to stand for the
proposition that a general law applied against a protected class may
51
violate equal protection. In fact, the opinion was seen at the time as
52
an application of Barbier’s class-legislation principle. The ordinance
at issue in Yick Wo required laundry owners to obtain a permit from
San Francisco’s board of supervisors but exempted laundries housed
53
in brick or stone buildings from the permitting requirement. Unlike

48. Haun, 59 P. at 344 (quoting Goodwill, 10 S.E. at 286).
49. Barbier, 113 U.S. 27, was cited 175 times in state and federal courts before 1900; by
1935, it had been cited over 900 times in state and federal courts. LEXIS, Federal and State
Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1884, and December 31, 1899, with the Barbier
citation; and search between January 1, 1884, and December 31, 1934, with the Barbier citation.
50. Barbier, 113 U.S. at 29.
51. See 11 JAY HAKIM & STEVEN MINTZ, A HISTORY OF US: SOURCEBOOK AND INDEX
172 (1999) (“This case established the principle that a law that appears to be racially neutral on
the surface is unconstitutional if it is applied in a discriminatory manner.”).
52. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 240 (1904) (declaring that police power
does not justify discrimination against a “class” and citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886)); BURDICK, supra note 13, § 279, at 593 (citing Yick Wo with Barbier and its classic
statements against “class legislation”); JOHN S. WISE, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
211–12 (1906) (citing Yick Wo with Barbier and stating that the case stood for the principle that
“to deny to a class” equal protection violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
53. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357.
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in Barbier, however, there was evidence that the supervisors had
applied the ordinance to favor some and disfavor others:
No reason whatever, except the will of the supervisors, is assigned
why they should not be permitted to carry on, in the accustomed
manner, their harmless and useful occupation, on which they depend
for a livelihood. And while this consent of the supervisors is
withheld from them and from two hundred others who have also
petitioned, all of whom happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty
others, not Chinese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same
54
business under similar conditions.

In practice, the law divided the “owners or occupiers into two
classes . . . by an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are
permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and consent of the
supervisors, and on the other those from whom that consent is
55
withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.” It was the arbitrariness of
the governing body’s (the supervisors’) decisionmaking (depriving
people of work because they were Chinese subjects) that defeated the
law under the class-legislation principle.
56
Holden v. Hardy completes the triad. State courts were
struggling mightily with whether regulations singling out particular
employments could survive equal protection scrutiny. In the last
decade of the nineteenth century, some state courts had struck down
an odd assortment of laws on equal protection grounds, from laws
aimed at regulating the payment of workers to those regulating the
57
Sabbath to those regulating hours of work. In Holden, the question
54. Id. at 374.
55. Id. at 368. Although Barbier was much more frequently cited, Yick Wo was considered
a class-legislation decision. See, e.g., Bailey, 219 U.S. at 223 (citing Yick Wo as a class-legislation
case); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 478 (1903) (reprinting the statement of Wilford H. Smith,
counsel for the appellant).
56. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
57. See, e.g., Ex parte Jentzsch, 44 P. 803, 805 (Cal. 1896) (striking down a law barring
barbers from working on Sundays as class legislation); In re Morgan, 58 P. 1071, 1072, 1084
(Colo. 1899) (striking down a law that limited the workday of smelters and miners working in
underground mines to eight hours as class legislation); In re Eight-Hour Law, 39 P. 328, 329
(Colo. 1895) (per curiam) (striking down a law prohibiting mining and manufacturing
companies from contracting with their employees for a workday longer than eight hours as
“manifestly in violation of the constitutional inhibition against class legislation”); Eden v.
People, 43 N.E. 1108, 1111 (Ill. 1896) (same); State v. Haun, 59 P. 340, 346 (Kan. 1899) (striking
down a law that required workers to be paid in money rather than scrip for creating a class
distinction); State v. Granneman, 33 S.W. 784, 785 (Mo. 1896) (striking down a law barring
barbers from working on Sundays as class legislation); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362,
368 (Neb. 1894) (striking down a law prohibiting mechanics, servants, and laborers—not
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was whether Utah could limit the hours of workers in the mining
58
industry. The case was argued both as a due process and an equal
59
protection challenge.
In this, Holden was far from unusual. Although today equal
60
protection and due process arguments are considered quite separate,
equal protection and due process once went hand-in-hand. Both were
part of the police-power rhetoric of the day which held that the rights
could be overcome by the state’s interest in health and safety—as
61
long as the law was not arbitrary. Inequality was one possible
manifestation of arbitrariness. As Professor Ernst Freund would put
it in his treatise on police power, “[T]he two ideas [equal protection
and due process] are closely associated in the minds of the courts”
and, in fact in some cases, have been treated as almost the same
62
thing. The class-legislation argument made in Holden was simple:
the legislature had no power to single out one industry for regulation
63
and to leave other industries unregulated. Doing so imposed a
burden on one set of citizens not shared by others. Although such an
argument might seem odd to a twenty-first century reader, it was
64
successful in various state courts prior to Holden.

including farm or domestic laborers—from working more than eight hours per day). For a
contemporary description of the case law in greater detail, see generally Henry R. Seager, The
Attitude of American Courts Towards Restrictive Labor Laws, 19 POL. SCI. Q. 589 (1904).
58. Holden, 169 U.S. at 367.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610–11 (2005) (explaining the difference
between the equal protection and due process concerns involved in the case).
61. See, e.g., Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188 (1900) (“Regulations respecting the
pursuit of a lawful trade or business are of very frequent occurrence . . . and what such
regulations shall be . . . are questions for the State to determine, and their determination comes
within the . . . police power . . . unless the regulations are so utterly unreasonable and
extravagant . . . that the property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and in a
manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with or destroyed without due process of law . . . .”). For
other citations of this rule, see infra note 85.
62. FREUND, supra note 24, § 611, at 632. Indeed, this understanding lived on for quite
some time. As Chief Justice Taft would later explain, in 1921, it was “customary” for the two
arguments to be considered together. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–32 (1921).
63. Holden, 169 U.S. at 397–98.
64. In re Eight-Hour Law, 39 P. 328, 329 (Colo. 1895) (per curiam) (striking down a law
prohibiting mining and manufacturing companies from contracting with their employees for a
workday longer than eight hours as “manifestly in violation of the constitutional inhibition
against class legislation”); Low v. Rees Printing Co., 59 N.W. 362, 368 (Neb. 1894) (striking
down a law prohibiting mechanics, servants, and laborers—not including farm or domestic
laborers—from working more than eight hours per day).
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The Supreme Court in Holden recognized that, if this was what
class legislation meant, then very few laws would survive equal
65
protection scrutiny. Singling out could not be the sole measure of
laws that violate equal protection because almost all law singles out,
and it often singles out, not for reasons suggesting inequality, but
simply out of the necessity of dealing with the particular needs or
dangers of an industry. The Court upheld the regulation: under the
police power, the state had the right to enact any law—even a law
that interfered with existing rights—for the purposes of protecting the
66
public health and safety. In Holden, the Court determined that
67
protection of miners was protection of the public. Put in other
words, the Court found that any statutory underinclusion served a
public purpose; it was for the common benefit. That rationale was
sufficient to defeat the class-legislation argument.
Holden, however, did not defeat the efforts of big business to use
equality doctrine to attack regulation. These efforts persisted in part
because a number of Justices, not to mention lawyers, held onto the
class-legislation idea. One can see this in a case decided a year after
68
Holden—Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Railroad Co. v. Matthews.
Matthews involved a Kansas statute that changed common law
69
negligence rules in cases in which a railroad caused fire damage. The
railroad argued that it was being exempted from the common law
rule: everyone except railroads was protected by the negligence
70
71
requirement. Following Holden’s police-power analysis, the Court
72
rejected the class-legislation claim. Special burdens were “often
73
necessary for general benefits.” The railroad posed a special risk of
74
fire, and regulating the railroad served the public good.
Even as it upheld regulation and rejected the railroad’s equality
argument, the Court insistently restated the class-legislation principle:
“[T]he equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution forbids the
legislature to select a person, natural or artificial, and impose upon
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See Holden, 169 U.S. at 388.
Id. at 398.
Id. at 396–97.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé R.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96 (1899).
See id. at 97.
See id.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 101.

NOURSE IN FINAL2.DOC

972

3/16/2009 3:18:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:955

him or it burdens and liabilities which are not cast upon others
similarly situated. It cannot pick out one individual, or one
corporation, and enact” rules not applicable to similarly situated
75
persons. Citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Matthews Court explained
that, “[e]ven where the selection is not obviously unreasonable and
arbitrary, if the discrimination is based upon matters which have no
relation to the object sought to be accomplished, the same conclusion
76
of unconstitutionality is affirmed.” The Court went on to explain
that this analysis required it to move beyond the surface of the
statute, noting that in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court “looked beyond
the mere letter of the ordinance to the condition of things as they
existed in San Francisco, and saw that under the guise of regulation
77
an arbitrary classification was intended and accomplished.”
The majority consistently restated the police power principle to
persuade the four dissenting Justices, including Justice Harlan, who
argued that the exemption from the common law rule was in fact a
78
violation of equal protection. The dissenters relied on Gulf,
79
Colorado & Santa Fé Railway v. Ellis, which involved a Texas
statute permitting litigants to recover attorneys’ fees from a railroad
80
when the railroad had lost a suit. The argument in Ellis was that the
railroad was, in effect, being exempted from rules applicable to other
debtors; that it did not enter “courts upon equal terms” with other
81
debtors. Relying on Ellis, the dissenters in Matthews argued that the
law exempting the railroad from common law rules violated the
82
Equal Protection Clause.
Matthews reveals three central facets of class-legislation analysis:
First, the rule tended to focus on arguments in which “singling out”
83
existed on the surface of the statute—in other words, on exemptions.
75. Id. at 104.
76. Id. at 105.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 110 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fé Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
80. Id. at 151–52.
81. Id. at 153.
82. Matthews, 174 U.S. at 110–11 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
83. The focus on exemption was part of the general understanding of “class legislation.”
See, e.g., United States v. Sugar, 243 F. 423, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1917) (“It is therefore unnecessary
to consider the questions whether such exemptions are such arbitrary discriminations as to
render such statute class legislation . . . .”); Kendall v. People, 125 P. 586, 587 (Colo. 1912)
(“[S]uch exemption rendered the act special or class legislation inhibited by the Constitution of
Colorado . . . .”); Alpheus T. Mason, The Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act, 18 AM. POL. SCI.
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Second, even if state courts found it initially a plausible way to strike
down regulation, the United States Supreme Court tended to reject
the argument. Contrary to common belief, far more regulation was
actually upheld during the so-called laissez-faire period than was
84
struck down : rights during this period were in fact rather weaker
protections than are thought because the state could rely on a strong
85
police power argument. Third, the class-legislation principle was not

REV. 489, 509 (1924) (“[T]he principle against class legislation would not permit [Congress] to
give to laborers, or any other particular class, special exemptions under the antitrust laws.”).
84. A number of historical investigations have established this, beginning with that of
Professor Charles Warren. See Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States
Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294, 294–95 (1913); see also Ray A. Brown, Due Process of
Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. REV. 943, 944 (1927) (“[S]ince 1920 the
Court has passed on [cases involving substantive legislation of a social or economic character] in
fifty-three cases, and has held against the legislation in fifteen of them.”); Michael J. Phillips,
The Progressiveness of the Lochner Court, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 453, 454 (1998) (“[I]t is widely
recognized that the old Court rejected more substantive due process challenges than it
granted . . . .”); Melvin I. Urofsky, Myth and Reality: The Supreme Court and Protective
Legislation in the Progressive Era, 1983 Y.B., SUPREME COURT HIST. SOC’Y 53, 69 (“In areas of
maximum hours and minimum wages, employer liability and workmen’s compensation, and
state child labor regulation, the Court during the Progressive era nearly always supported
reform efforts.” (footnote omitted)); Charles Warren, A Bulwark to the State Police Power—
The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 667, 669 (1913) (“‘Due process’ and the
‘police power’ both being indefinite terms, the Court has exercised a wide discretion in
enlarging the scope of both in favor of the State.”). These empirics are controversial on two
grounds. First, numbers are not everything, and, as critics rightly claim, numbers do not reflect
the degree to which a decision was legally or politically controversial and thus shed a negative
shadow on legislatures or important public affairs. In fact, as one of us has argued elsewhere,
the Supreme Court’s labor decisions were extremely controversial and had an enormous impact
on the right to unionize and to strike. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners, 97 CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 48–53, on file with the Duke Law Journal). Second,
critics have urged that the numbers reflect a purely internalist, doctrinal view, which is
historically misleading. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971, 1019 (2000) [hereinafter Friedman,
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty] (noting public criticism of the doctrine). For a
critique of the numbers, see Paul Kens, The Source of a Myth: Police Powers of the States and
Laissez Faire Constitutionalism, 1900–1937, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 70, 72 (1991). For the most
balanced view of this period, see generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE
20TH CENTURY 44–79 (2002) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW]. For clarification of the
figure of “over two hundred” laws struck down, which appears in textbooks, see Nourse, supra
(manuscript at 47–48).
85. Some of the more infamous cases of the 1920s tend to leave the impression that an
absolute property or contract right existed. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,
546 (1923) (“[F]reedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the
exception . . . .”). But classic cases often leave a false impression of the general run-of-the-mine
doctrine. At the time, the general rule was that rights, even personal rights, could be trumped by
the common welfare. See, e.g., Schmidinger v. City of Chi., 226 U.S. 578, 587 (1913) (“The right
of state legislatures or municipalities acting under state authority to regulate trades and callings
in the exercise of the police power is too well settled to require any extended discussion.”); Chi.,
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only a principle of classification simpliciter, but carried with it
86
inchoate, and sometimes changing, notions of governance.
B. Class Legislation and the Lochner Decision: 1900–1910
The period from 1900 through 1910 is known as the Lochner era
based on the infamous 1905 decision in Lochner v. New York.
Lochner struck down a New York statute limiting the working hours
of bakers. In the modern era, Lochner has been reviled as the
quintessential example of the dangers of substantive due process, with
87
all its “repulsive connotation of value-laden” judicial review. To
emphasize the point, Lochner has been dubbed the twin of the most
88
controversial decision of the end of the twentieth century, Roe v.
89
Wade. The conventional view is that the Lochner Court originated
substantive due process by creating the right to contract. In fact, as
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 567 (1911) (“There is no absolute
freedom to do as one wills or to contract as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not
withdraw from legislative supervision . . . the making of contracts . . . . Liberty implies the
absence of arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable regulations and prohibitions
imposed in the interests of the community.”); Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.S. 79, 90 (1910) (“It
is a principle which underlies every reasonable exercise of the police power that private rights
must yield to the common welfare.” (quoting Williams v. State, 108 S.W. 838, 840 (Ark. 1908)));
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905) (“[T]he police power, is an exercise of the
sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general
welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.”
(emphasis added)); Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 140, 142 (Mich. 1925) (“[N]o citizen has any
rights superior to the common welfare. Acting for the public good, the state, in the exercise of
its police powers, may always impose reasonable restrictions upon the natural and constitutional
rights of its citizens.”); see also NOURSE, supra note 5, at 16 (“Before World War II, what we
now consider basic civil rights were often weak, easily overcome by the needs of the common
welfare, then called the ‘police power.’”); Nourse, supra note 84 (manuscript at 2–3) (“[R]ights
could be trumped easily by claims of the general welfare . . . .”).
86. See, e.g., Gilbert E. Brach, Is There Danger Ahead?, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 152, 155 (1921)
(stating that when a body or group, such as laborers or farmers, combines to legislate its
economic superiority, then “democracy is lost”); John F. Dillon, Property—Its Rights and
Duties in Our Legal and Social Systems, Address Before the New York State Bar Association
(Jan. 15, 1895), in 29 AM. L. REV. 161, 173 (1895) (“The one thing to be feared in our
democratic republic, and therefore to be guarded against with sleepless vigilance, is class power
and class legislation.”); Thomas R. Marshall, The Enemies of Free Government in America, 5
B.U. L. REV. 153, 156 (1925) (arguing that class legislation and the “class idea” will destroy
democracy).
87. Gunther, supra note 1, at 42; see also Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and
Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV.
249, 250 (1987) (“Lochner . . . is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of
subjective judicial activism.”).
88. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L. J.
920, 939–40 (1973).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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90

historians know, this view is caricatured. Lochner did not invent a
right in the modern sense of the term because the idea of right at the
91
time was different from today’s concept of right-as-trump. Neither
Lochner nor most other cases during this period used the term
92
“substantive due process.” Lochner was argued, although not
decided, as a class-legislation case (because the law applied only to
93
bakers).
Whatever one’s position on Lochner and its claims of right, it
should not diminish the argument we make here that equal protection
94
arguments were alive and well at the turn of the twentieth century.
As Professor Ernst Freund put it in 1904, “The principle of equality is
relied upon more and more to check the exercise of governmental
95
powers.” Behind the focus on class legislation lay the great battles of
labor and capital of the day; although Holden had upheld regulation
96
of mines, doubts remained about whether that holding would apply
elsewhere because state courts had reached contrary conclusions and
because the Court’s own equivocation in Matthews suggested
otherwise. By 1904, Freund would write that the Supreme Court had
traditionally “leaned strongly against allowing the plea of a violation
of the equal protection of the laws,” but “recent decisions show a
97
tendency to subject statutory classification to a more rigid test.” He
98
was referring to two cases: Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards and

90. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 1; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND
241–68 (2000).
91. Nourse, supra note 84 (manuscript at 2–3, 44–46).
92. White, supra note 16, at 87 n.2.
93. See id. at 93–103. Some believe that Lochner is in fact consistent with the classlegislation tradition. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 132. We believe that this claim is
exaggerated. Lochner was a standard police-power case of the day. See Nourse, supra note 84
(manuscript at 17–21); infra Part II.C.
94. In fact, the incidence of the term increased substantially from the last decade of the
nineteenth to the first decade of the twentieth century. In the period from 1900 until 1910, the
term “class legislation” appeared in federal and state court opinions 410 times, whereas the
same search yielded 221 opinions in the period from 1890 through 1900. Those numbers likely
underestimate the incidence of the doctrine as, in state courts, it often went by the name of
“special legislation” as well. LEXIS, Federal and State Cases, Combined, searches between
January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1910, and between January 1, 1890, and December 31, 1900,
using the “opinion” segment to avoid “counsel” references, with the term “class legislation.”
95. FREUND, supra note 24, § 610, at 631.
96. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898).
97. FREUND, supra note 24, § 610, at 632.
98. Cotting v. Kan. City Stock Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
THE NEW DEAL
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99

Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. In their day, both were more
100
common citations than Lochner v. New York.
101
Cotting involved the regulation of stockyards. The Kansas City
Stock Yards challenged the regulation on the ground that it was
general in form only, applying to one business—the Kansas City
102
yard. The majority found a violation of equal protection as well as
due process (the stockyard’s property had been “taken”). Six Justices
“assent[ed] to the judgment of reversal” on the ground that the
statute applied “only to the Kansas City Stock Yards Company and
not to other companies or corporations engaged in like business in
Kansas, and thereby denie[d] to that company the equal protection of
103
the laws.”
In retrospect, Cotting seems a rather odd case, but, at the time,
104
the Supreme Court considered it of “profoundest significance.” The
case raised fears that majorities would use regulations to target
business unfairly, raising fears of an incipient socialism:
Is it true in this country that one who . . . succeeds in building up a
large and profitable business, becomes thereby a legitimate object of
the legislative scalping knife? Having created the facilities which the
many enjoy, can the many turn around and say, you are making too
much out of those facilities, and you must divide with us your
105
profits? We cannot shut our eyes to well-known facts.

Cotting’s fear of majorities contradicts contemporary
constitutional sensibilities, which tend toward majoritarian deference.
Yet it is difficult to deny that the theory of equality applied by the
Court was based on an implicit political theory rather than a theory of
formal classification. Fear of the “legislative scalping knife” was fear
of improper governance—of majorities leading the country toward
socialism and communism. To be sure, Cotting used equality as a
shield against apparent legislative confiscation of property, not as a
sword to fight social oppression. But whatever the result of the case,
99. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
100. From 1905 to 1930, Lochner was cited 264 times, Cotting was cited 343 times, and
Connolly was cited 523 times. LEXIS, Federal and State Cases, Combined, search between
January 1, 1905, and December 31, 1930, for the Lochner citation (“198 U.S. 45”), the Cotting
citation (“183 U.S. 79”), and the Connolly citation (“184 U.S. 540”).
101. Cotting, 183 U.S. at 79–80.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 114–15.
104. Id. at 104.
105. Id. at 104–05.
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the ideas implicit in the decision emphasized ancient equality
doctrine, citing Judge Catron’s nineteenth-century decision in
106
Vanzant v. Waddel : “Every partial or private law, which directly
proposes to destroy or affect individual rights . . . is unconstitutional
and void. Were this otherwise, odious individuals and corporate
bodies would be governed by one rule, and the mass of the
107
community, who made the law, by another.”
If Cotting demonstrated that class legislation had not died in the
twentieth century, so too did one of the most important equal
protection decisions of that era—Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.
Although Connolly has faded from memory, it addressed one of the
most prominent issues of the day—antitrust. As Professor Owen Fiss
has explained, an antitrust case was once the equivalent of a civil
rights case, with antitrust symbolizing the progressive assault against
108
concentrated economic power. An exemption once again triggered
the equal protection claim: the law at issue in Connolly explicitly
109
exempted farmers and laborers.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the exemption violated the
Equal Protection Clause and struck down the statute in its entirety.
The implicit argument was precisely the same as in Cotting: that the
“exempted” majority in Kansas had legislated a burden on others
while preferring themselves. As the Court explained, a group of
farmers could conspire to set agricultural prices, and, under the
statute, nothing could be done; only nonagricultural businesses were
110
targeted for regulatory burdens. The Court viewed the exemption

106. Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829).
107. Cotting, 183 U.S. at 105 (quoting Vanzant, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 270).
108. OWEN M. FISS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at 158–65 (1993).
109. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 554 (1902) (“The provisions of this act
shall not apply to agricultural products or live stock while in the hands of the producer or raiser.”
(quoting 1893 Ill. Laws 182)).
110. The Court observed,
We have seen that under that statute all except producers of agricultural commodities
and raisers of live stock, who combine their capital, skill or acts for any of the
purposes named in the act, may be punished as criminals, while agriculturalists and
live stock raisers, in respect of their products or live stock in hand, are exempted from
the operation of the statute, and may combine and do that which, if done by others,
would be a crime against the State.
Id. at 560. It concluded, “[W]e must hold that the legislature would not have entered upon or
continued the policy indicated by the statute unless agriculturalists and live stock dealers were
excluded from its operation and thereby protected from prosecution.” Id. at 565.
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as problematic because it reflected a partial exercise of political
power; farmers, predominant in the legislature, were self-dealing.
With the passage of time, it is easy to characterize Connolly, like
Cotting, as using equal protection as a sword to strike down business
regulation in the service of a laissez-faire regime. For our purposes,
however, the important point is the form, not the result, of the
argument. The equality argument was not about classification
simpliciter but about political favoritism. Although corporations no
longer seem similarly situated to political minorities, this is precisely
111
the implication of the Court’s opinions in Connolly and Cotting. The
same class-legislation principle that aimed to secure the Chinese
minority in Yick Wo was applied in Cotting and Connolly to protect a
stockyard and a railroad on the theory that they were, in effect,
politically disadvantaged minorities. This reflected embedded and
often inarticulate fears, not of logic or classification, but of
governance generally—that mob-like majorities would turn the
112
country toward socialism or communism. The fear may have been
exaggerated, but it was not a fear of classification alone, but a fear of
governance.

111. See WHITE, supra note 90, at 246 (“One example of such tyranny or corruption was
legislation that violated the ‘anti-class’ principle by failing to demonstrate that it was an
appropriately ‘general’ use of the police powers, as distinguished from an inappropriately
‘partial’ one. That type of legislation amounted to the favoring of one class or interest above
another . . . .”).
112. The reference to communism and socialism was a common one. See, e.g., C.G. Haines,
Note, Minimum Wage Act for District of Columbia Held Unconstitutional, 2 TEX. L. REV. 99,
100–01 (1923) (“All such legislation has as its design to level inequalities of wealth, is socialistic
in its trend, and leads to the dangers of bolshevism and revolution. ‘The tendency of the times,’
said [Justice Van Orsdel], ‘to socialize property rights under the subterfuge of police regulations
is dangerous, and if continued will prove destructive to our free institutions.’” (quotation error
in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Children’s Hosp. v. Adkins, 284 F. 613, 622 (D.C. Cir.
1922))); see also Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 223 (1917) (reporting
plaintiff’s counsel’s argument that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to preclude such
philanthropic interference with the liberty of a self-reliant race. If the centralized advantages of
communism or socialism are deemed preferable, the Constitution provides a method of
amendment resulting in certainty of right” (emphasis added)); United States v. Joint Traffic
Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 546 (1898) (reporting the solicitor general’s argument that “[u]ndoubtedly
there is unrest, dissatisfaction, tendencies to anarchy and socialism, but these result not from
competition, but the throttling of competition by trusts and combinations” (emphasis added));
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 674 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“It was
said in argument that the passage of the statute imposing this income tax was an assault by the
poor upon the rich, and by much eloquent speech this court has been urged to stand in the
breach for the protection of the just rights of property against the advancing hosts of socialism.”
(emphasis added)).
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Because of Cotting and Connolly, class legislation loomed large
by the time the Court, in 1905, was asked to decide Lochner v. New
113
York. Indeed, as historians have shown, Lochner’s innovation was
114
its embrace of the right to contract rather than equal protection.
Lochner rejected the litigants’ class legislation argument. When
Justice Holmes, in his Lochner dissent, wrote that the majority had
relied on “an economic theory which a large part of the country does
115
not entertain,” he was emphasizing what might have been clearer if
the Court had emphasized class legislation and legislative favoritism.
For Holmes, both class legislation and right to contract were
reflections of laissez-faire ideology, which violated the first principle
116
of judicial review: courts should defer to legislatures.
By the time Lochner was decided, the class-legislation doctrine
was already showing itself to be a difficult line to follow. As Justice
Holmes would eventually write, there had always been a strain of
class-legislation rhetoric that appeared to equate the doctrine with
textual classification, which was a purely formal doctrine, not one
117
based on assumptions about legislative favoritism. Classification,
113. See supra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 128 (noting that the majority opinion did not
“explicitly rely on the language of unequal, partial, or class legislation in striking down the New
York act” but rather focused on the right to contract); White, supra note 16, at 100 (“The
Court’s majority decision in Lochner . . . has been characterized as an example of judicial
invocation of the doctrine of ‘liberty of contract’ . . . .”).
115. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes’s famous
reference to Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics, see id., was to a by-then outmoded political theory:
the best state is the state that governs the least, see HERBERT SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS: OR,
THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS SPECIFIED, AND THE FIRST OF THEM
DEVELOPED 321 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1850) (“Thus, if we regard government as a
means of upholding the social state, we find that . . . there are several subsidiary ways in which
the assumption of additional functions endangers the fulfilment [sic] of its original function.”).
116. On Holmes’s devotion to deference to legislatures, see FELIX FRANKFURTER, MR.
JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT 31 (1938).
117. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (“[T]he law does all that is needed when
it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring
within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow.”); Dominion Hotel,
Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 268 (1919) (“The equal protection of the laws does not mean that
all occupations that are called by the same name must be treated in the same way. . . . It may do
what it can to prevent what is deemed an evil and stop short of those cases in which the harm to
the few concerned is thought less important than the harm to the public that would ensue if the
rule laid down were made mathematically exact.”); Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234
U.S. 224, 227 (1914) (“[W]hile there are differences of opinion as to the degree and kind of
discrimination permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment, it is established by repeated decisions
that a statute aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where experience
shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset by thinking up and enumerating other instances to
which it might have been applied equally well, so far as the court can see. That is for the
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courts repeatedly insisted, was by its nature inequality; if legislation
was to be pursued at all, it would have to be pursued unequally.
Based on this rationale, and with the aid of the police-power
justification, Cotting and Connolly turned out to be the exceptions
that kept equality arguments going, even if they failed far more often
than they succeeded. Equal protection arguments in the Supreme
Court were, at the time, a dime a dozen, but they were easily met by
claims—much like claims of personal right—that legislatures had the
118
police power to regulate.
legislature to judge unless the case is very clear.”); Cent. Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S.
157, 160–61 (1912) (“If a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the
legislature seeks to prevent, the Fourteenth Amendment allows it to be dealt with although
otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law.” (citing
Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401, 411 (1905))).
118. A simple search for “equal protection” during this timeframe resulted in 275 cases.
LEXIS, U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition, search between January 1, 1900, and
December 31, 1910, with the term “equal protection.” The results included numerous instances
of the Court rejecting equal protection claims. E.g., Mobile, Jackson & Kan. City R.R. Co. v.
Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 40 (1910) (holding that a Mississippi statute abrogating the common
law “fellow-servant rule as to ‘every [employee] of a railroad corporation’” did not violate equal
protection and noting that the Court “has never . . . construed the limitation imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment upon the power of the State to legislate with reference to particular
employments as to render ineffectual a general classification resting upon obvious principles of
public policy because it may happen that the classification includes persons not subject to a
uniform degree of danger” (quoting MISS. CODE of 1892, § 3559)); Griffith v. Connecticut, 218
U.S. 563, 571 (1910) (holding that a statute exempting banks or trust companies and bona fide
mortgages from a different statute prohibiting more than 15 percent interest on loans did not
violate equal protection); Moffitt v. Kelly, 218 U.S. 400, 405–06 (1910) (holding that the Court
did not have the power to review an equal protection challenge to a statute subjecting a wife’s
inheritance to community property laws); District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 152
(1909) (holding that a law making resident owners of property criminally liable for failing to
connect to the city sewer but assessing damages against the property of nonresident owners did
not violate equal protection); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107–08 (1909) (holding that a
Massachusetts law limiting the height of all buildings to 125 feet above the grade of the street,
enacted under the police power, did not violate equal protection); Mobile, Jackson & Kan. City
R.R. Co. v. Mississippi, 210 U.S. 187, 205 (1908) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a
statute requiring railroads to broaden and standardize a narrow-gauge road and stating “[t]hat it
denies the companies the equal protection of the law, we may say, is without any foundation”
and “[n]o discrimination against them is pointed out”); Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U.S. 340,
348 (1908) (holding that a law taxing distilled spirits in bonded warehouses did not violate equal
protection); The Employers’ Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463, 503–04 (1908) (rejecting a railroad’s
equal protection challenge to a wrongful death statute); Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co. v. N.C. Corp.
Comm’n, 206 U.S. 1, 25 (1907) (concluding that the North Carolina Corporation Commission’s
order that a railroad restore a principal connection between the eastern and western parts of the
state did not violate equal protection); Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 542–43 (1906)
(rejecting an argument that classifications in a North Carolina law prohibiting the operation of a
“bucket shop” rendered the law unconstitutional); Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243,
255 (1906) (holding that a Missouri statute precluding life insurance companies, domestic or
foreign, from asserting a defense based on the false and fraudulent statements in the application
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C. Class Legislation and the Police Power: 1910–1920
After Lochner, one might have thought equal protection would
die. In fact, it lived on in both state and federal courts; citation to
“class legislation” remained relatively steady during the next decade,
119
1910–1920. As one Tennessee court said in 1911,
We are of opinion that for this discrimination this act is arbitrary
and vicious class legislation; that it denies all corporations doing
business in Tennessee the equal protection of the laws, and is in
contravention of the Constitution of this State and of that of the
120
United States, and void.

Literally dozens, if not hundreds, of cases in the state courts of
this period dealt with class legislation as an equal protection
121
argument. Most frequently, these claims failed on the theory that
did not violate equal protection); St. John v. New York, 201 U.S. 633, 636–37 (1906) (holding
that a statute distinguishing between producing and nonproducing vendors of milk did not
violate equal protection); McChord v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 183 U.S. 483, 495 (1902)
(rejecting an argument that a Kentucky statute setting railroad rates violated equal protection);
Murdock v. Ward, 178 U.S. 139, 147 (1900) (rejecting an allegation that an internal revenue tax
violated equal protection).
119. References in federal and state opinions to “class legislation” from 1910 through 1920
hovered at about four hundred, as they did from 1900 through 1910. LEXIS, Federal and State
Cases, Combined, search between January 1, 1910, and December 31, 1920, and between
January 1, 1900, and December 31, 1910, using the “opinion” segment to avoid “counsel”
references, with the term “class legislation.”
120. State v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 135 S.W. 773, 776 (Tenn. 1911).
121. See, e.g., State v. McGuire, 167 N.W. 592, 594 (Iowa 1918) (rejecting an argument that
an Iowa statute made an unconstitutional distinction between owners of male horses and
owners of bulls and boars offered for sale); Schulz v. Parker, 139 N.W. 173, 178–79 (Iowa 1912)
(rejecting an argument that a statute prohibiting railway companies from giving free passes
constituted class legislation); Hubbell v. Higgins, 126 N.W. 914, 916 (Iowa 1910) (rejecting an
argument that a statute providing for inspection of hotels accommodating ten or more guests
was unconstitutional class legislation and stating that “[c]lassification must be reasonable and
based upon real differences in the situation, conditions, and tendencies of things” because “[i]f
there is no real difference between persons, occupations, or property, the state cannot make one
in favor of some persons over others”); McGuire v. Chi., B. & Q. R. Co., 108 N.W. 902, 906
(Iowa 1906) (“That legislation imposing upon railway companies special restrictions,
obligations, and liabilities not generally applicable to other persons or corporations is not a
denial of the equal protection of the laws has been so often decided as to be no longer a
debatable question.”); Mier v. Phillips Fuel Co., 107 N.W. 621, 625 (Iowa 1906) (“Nor do we
think this statute open to the criticism that it is class legislation. Its object is the protection of
landowners against subsurface encroachments. It extends to all who operate coal mines, at least,
and protects all from whose land coal is taken without their consent. Such classification is
uniformly upheld for not only all persons brought under its influence are treated alike under the
same conditions but all are brought within its influence who are under the same conditions.”);
Iowa Mut. Tornado Ins. Ass’n v. Gilbertson, 106 N.W. 153, 156 (Iowa 1906) (rejecting a classlegislation argument); Gano v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 87 N.W. 714, 719 (Iowa 1901)
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there was a general police-power justification for the statute. Those
who hoped to resist regulation were often quickly disappointed, as in
122
Payne v. Kansas, in which the Supreme Court upheld a law
123
requiring those selling farm products to have a license. The Court
summarily rejected the claim that the regulation was class legislation
distinguishing between some farmers and others stating that there
was a general reason for the law: “Manifestly, the purpose of the state
was to prevent certain evils incident to the business of commission
124
merchants in farm products by regulating it.”
As these claims became increasingly repetitive and easily
resolved by the police power, they began to sound almost modern—
equating equality to classification simpliciter. Repeatedly, courts
125
invoked the state’s “large discretion to classify.” As the Ninth
(holding that a statute requiring railroad companies exercising the power of eminent domain to
pay landowners reasonable attorneys’ fees incident to condemnation proceedings or appeals
was not unconstitutional as class legislation because the burden imposed applied equally to all
of a certain class exercising the power granted); State v. Garbroski, 82 N.W. 959, 960 (Iowa
1900) (holding that a statute requiring certain peddlers to obtain a license was invalid and
stating that “[t]he classification here attempted rests solely on a past and completed transaction,
having no relation to the particular legislation enacted”); Rambo v. Larrabee, 73 P. 915, 918
(Kan. 1903) (“It is entirely competent for the Legislature to adapt its laws, general in their
nature, to general classifications either of individuals, surroundings, or conditions; but such
classification must always be a natural one, not an arbitrary or fictitious one.”); State v. Smiley,
69 P. 199, 208 (Kan. 1902) (rejecting a class-legislation argument); Criswell v. State, 94 A. 549,
551 (Md. 1915) (holding that a statute requiring a license fee of individuals working as barbers
at the time the statute was enacted was not unconstitutional); Groesbeck v. Detroit United Ry.,
177 N.W. 726, 737–38 (Mich. 1920) (rejecting a class-legislation argument over a strong dissent);
Seamer v. Great N. Ry. Co., 172 N.W. 765, 770 (Minn. 1919) (“The constitutional prohibitions
of class legislation are the same now as then. A marked change, however, has come in the view
taken by the courts of the different states, and by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
by our own, upon the question of what is a proper classification for legislative purposes. More
and more the question is felt to be a legislative one which it is presumed the Legislature has
rightly determined.”); Halsell v. Merchants’ Union Ins. Co., 62 So. 235, 236 (Miss. 1913)
(“Stripped of details, and of its regulation, supervision, and license features, we find an effort to
confer special immunities and privileges upon certain defined associations, engaged in the
ordinary business of loaning money. This is to be accomplished by naming the preferred class
building and loan associations. The law fixes the contractual limit of interest charges, and it was
not within the power of the Legislature to exempt, by special act, the associations and
corporations defined from the general law, under the guise of an artificial and purely imaginary
special classification of the preferred class.”); Mo., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Braddy, 135 S.W. 1059,
1060 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911) (“[I]t is insisted that said article is unconstitutional because it is class
legislation . . . . This assignment must be sustained.”).
122. Payne v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 112 (1918).
123. Id. at 113.
124. Id.
125. The leading case suggesting the state’s power to classify was Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) (“A classification having some reasonable basis does
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Circuit explained in Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp., in which
the claim was that mining regulation was class legislation: “[t]he
legislature possesses a wide scope of discretion in the exercise of its
function of classification, and such legislation can be condemned as
vicious only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore
127
purely arbitrary.” This language reflects a general trend: courts
would continue to state the basic principle of class legislation but
would quickly limit it. As the Delaware Supreme Court put it:
If such legislation amounts to class legislation as it is generally
termed—that is, legislation that discriminates against some and
favors others—it is prohibited by the amendment; but legislation,
which in carrying out a public purpose is limited in its application,
and within the sphere of its operation, affects alike all persons
128
similarly situated, is not within the amendment.

If class-legislation cases typically failed, when did they succeed?
The answer is that they were more likely to succeed when a strong
liberty interest was at stake. This served to cabin equal protection—
equal protection did not cover all cases involving classification, only
those in which something significant was at stake. It also had an
implied, and inarticulate, political rationale: liberty provided a
129
baseline from which deviation suggested abuse of legislative power.
As scholars have known for some time, without a common baseline,
130
equality claims are largely empty, formal exercises. A strong liberty
interest can provide not only a common baseline but also a warning
sign for political malfunction. If liberty means those things that
everyone in society shares, exemption from the shared baseline

not offend [equal protection] . . . . [I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would
sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.”).
126. Johnston v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 248 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1918).
127. Id. at 413.
128. Heffernan v. Chester-Cambridge Bank & Trust Co., 91 A. 385, 389 (Del. 1914). For
similar state court cases during this period dealing with class-legislation arguments, see Leonard
v. Am. Life & Annuity Co., 77 S.E. 41, 42 (Ga. 1913); State v. Horn, 152 P. 275, 276–79 (Idaho
1915); Casparis Stone Co. v. Indus. Bd., 115 N.E. 822, 822–23 (Ill. 1917); People v. Gordon, 113
N.E. 864, 865–70 (Ill. 1916).
129. BURDICK, supra note 13, § 279, at 593 (“It has been for the protection of civil rights
that the equal protection clause has been resorted to . . . .”).
130. See Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right, 65 B.U. L. REV. 387 passim
(1985) [hereinafter Simons, Equality]; Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80
B.U. L. REV. 693 passim (2000) [hereinafter Simons, Egalitarian Norms]; Cass R. Sunstein,
Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 883–902 (1987); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of
Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 passim (1982).
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suggests abuse of power—that the majority is dealing itself benefits or
exempting itself from burdens imposed on others. As Professor
Rebecca Brown has put it, when majorities take away important
131
rights, they do not do it across the board but tend to do it to others.
The very importance of the underlying interest—in cases of this
period, the right to work—signaled something that should be shared
from which some were excluded.
132
A typical case was Truax v. Raich, in which the Supreme Court
133
struck down a statute that discriminated against aliens. Arizona had
134
a law limiting how many aliens businesses could hire. In 1915, the
Supreme Court struck it down, citing Yick Wo for the proposition
that aliens were in fact protected under the Fourteenth
135
Amendment. The loss of the right to work in the case was
considered quite significant; this right was what the Fourteenth
Amendment had been enacted to secure, insisted the Court, referring
to the “free labor” ideology that influenced the passage of the
136
Fourteenth Amendment. But the Court did not end there, as one
might expect if the right to work were a right as rights are viewed
today (as a stand-alone due process violation). Instead, the Court
explained that this serious deprivation triggered strong fears of
unequal protection: if the right to work “could be refused solely upon
the ground of race or nationality, the prohibition of the denial to any
person of the equal protection of the laws would be a barren form of
137
words.”
Raich was an anomaly if one cares about results: during this
period, as many scholars know, the Court’s civil rights decisions
involving immigration and the rights of African Americans were,
138
from contemporary perspectives, abysmal. What is less well known

131. Brown, supra note 1, at 1531.
132. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
133. Id. at 43.
134. Id. at 35.
135. Id. at 41.
136. On the influence of free-labor ideology, see generally NELSON, supra note 23, at 16;
William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free Labor: Labor and the Law in the Gilded Age, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 767.
137. Raich, 239 U.S. at 41.
138. See, e.g., Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86–87 (1927) (upholding a state’s power to
exclude children of Chinese descent from white schools); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 327,
330 (1926) (upholding a racially restrictive covenant between individuals); Porterfield v. Webb,
263 U.S. 225, 232–33 (1923) (upholding a California law denying aliens ineligible for citizenship
the right to lease or own land); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923) (upholding a
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is that this substantive failure to protect was accompanied by
repeated statements that race could not be used as a matter of
classification. There is nothing new about the divide between law’s
formality and its results; this gap yields scholars’ routine
condemnation of the period as a tragedy of equality law. Only when
139
there was a well-established claim of liberty did equality offer any
protection for those who we would today call minorities. In Buchanan
140
v. Warley, for example, the Supreme Court struck down de jure
141
racial segregation in the sale of property. But the Court refused to
142
intervene in education in Gong Lum v. Rice and Berea College v.
143
Kentucky, because there was no similar claim of liberty and a
144
pretense of equality (separate but equal). Curiously, these results
existed alongside pronouncements in northern and southern state
courts (not to mention the Supreme Court) embracing a rule of
formal equality: in a period when lynching was still a significant
practice, courts proclaimed, for example, that “color, race, nativity,
religious opinions, political affiliations, or the like . . . do not bear any
just, reasonable or proper relation to the subject of the legislation like
145
that in question.”
In retrospect, one wants to know why class legislation did not do
more in race cases. In fact, plaintiffs used equal protection arguments
in some cases. Class legislation was argued in segregated
146
transportation cases and in peonage cases —but it failed. The first

Washington law denying the aliens the right to own land unless they have declared “in good
faith” their intent to become citizens of the United States); United States v. Bhagat Singh
Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 207 (1923) (allowing Congress to restrict the naturalization process to
“white persons”); Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 51, 57–58 (1908) (upholding a state law
prohibiting corporations from teaching black children and white children in the same
institution); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2004) (“Scholars today tend to vilify the Court
for its performance during this era.”).
139. See Raich, 239 U.S. at 41 (“[T]he right to work for a living in the common occupations
of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity . . . .”).
140. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
141. Id. at 82.
142. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
143. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
144. Gong Lum, 275 U.S. at 85–86; Berea Coll., 211 U.S. at 54.
145. Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa. Super. 295, 305 (Super. Ct. 1907).
146. See, e.g., Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 223 (1911) (argument for the United States)
(peonage); Hall v. De Cuir, 95 U.S. 485, 508 (1877) (transportation); Bowie v. Birmingham Ry.
& Elec. Co., 27 So. 1016, 1020 (Ala. 1900) (transportation); State v. Jenkins, 92 A. 773, 773 (Md.
1914) (transportation); State v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 147 S.W. 118, 120 (Mo. 1912) (peonage);
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problem was formal equality—if the law addressed both races, if it
was formally separate and equal—then no equality problem appeared
147
at issue. The second problem was nature. Some courts held that
148
natural classifications were not arbitrary, and, in a period in which
149
the races were considered biologically distinct, classifications based
on race were often considered classifications of nature. The third
reason was the standard political theory of the day. The classlegislation argument had a number of potential strains to it, but one
of its great motivating impulses was the fear that legislatures had
been captured by factions, whether majorities or minorities. Although
a reader in 2009 is likely to see racial legislation as a classic example
of factionalism, this was not the political theory of the day, which was
150
driven by fears of socialism and communism, not apartheid.
D. Class Legislation Lives through the Taft Court: 1920–1930
Equal protection claims declined, but did not disappear, in the
151
period from 1920 until 1930.
As Professor Charles Burdick
explained in his constitutional law treatise in 1922, the “number of
cases which . . . involved the right to classify under the police power
152
[wa]s very great.” The concept appeared in some of the most
controversial cases of the 1920s. Indeed, it figured prominently in
153
Truax v. Corrigan, a case about one of the most hotly contested
154
issues of the day—the labor injunction. The argument was framed in

Chilton v. St. Louis & I. M. Ry. Co., 21 S.W. 457, 458–59 (Mo. 1893); State ex rel. Davis-Smith
Co. v. Clausen, 117 P. 1101, 1114 (Wash. 1911) (peonage).
147. See, e.g., James F. Minor, Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 18 VA. L. REG.
561, 564, 571 (1912) (arguing that such ordinances were constitutional “provided the
accommodations [we]re equal,” there was no “discrimination” and despite the principle that “all
legislation which discriminates against any particular race or class of persons is in violation of
the Constitution of the United States”).
148. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 346 n.13 (citing examples).
149. NOURSE, supra note 5, at 17–37.
150. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
151. In the period from 1920 through 1930, the term “class legislation” appeared in state and
federal opinions 322 times, as compared to the five hundred times it appeared in the earlier
decades, see supra note 94. LEXIS, Federal and State Cases, Combined, search between
January 1, 1920, and December 31, 1930, using the “opinion” segment to avoid “counsel”
references, with the term “class legislation.”
152. BURDICK, supra note 13, § 282, at 604.
153. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
154. Id. at 321–22; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION 154, 177–80 (1930) (detailing the labor dispute that lead to Corrigan and the
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terms of an exemption: businesses sought to use the injunction power
against strikers, but the strikers invoked a law exempting labor
actions from the general equitable injunction power.
Chief Justice Taft began by stating the by-then well-established
rule that it was “customary” to consider the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause together, but then noted that the
155
protections were not “coterminous.” The Due Process Clause, the
Court said, meant that all people should have their day in court and
156
“the benefit of the general law.” And, in this latter meaning, it
tended to secure “equality” as a “minimum of protection for every
157
one’s right of life, liberty and property.” “Our whole system of law
is predicated on the general, fundamental principle of equality of
158
application of the law. All men are equal before the law.”
This due process principle, however, the Court explained, was
simply a minimum of protection for equality. The “specific guaranty”
of equality was “aimed at undue favor and individual or class
privilege, on the one hand, and at hostile discrimination or the
159
oppression of inequality, on the other.” As in the past, this was tied
to explicit exemptions and linked back to what has come to be known
as a substantive right:
Immunity granted to a class, however limited, having the effect to
deprive another class, however limited, of a personal or property
right, is just as clearly a denial of equal protection of the laws to the
160
latter class as if the immunity were in favor of . . . a larger class.

The Court went on to cite Yick Wo for the proposition that laws
were to be universal in their application “without regard to any
161
differences of race, of color, or of nationality,”
noting the
162
“frequency with which” such principles had been invoked.
It would be left to Justice Holmes, in dissent, to illuminate the
implicit political theory of the majority. Arguing against the majority,

Court’s holding); FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW, supra note 84, at 75–76 (“The labor injunction
had terrorized organized labor for some forty years.”).
155. Corrigan, 257 U.S. at 332.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Id. at 332–33.
160. Id. at 333.
161. Id. (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886)).
162. Id. at 334.
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he identified and conceded their premise, that labor had “the
163
ascendancy that the exception seems to indicate,” referring to
labor’s power in the legislature to grant itself an exemption not
granted to others. Having expressed the fear of labor’s ascendancy,
Holmes rejected the argument on two grounds—one that did not
meet the argument and one that did. The first was the by-then-routine
claim of classification. Holmes’s Truax dissent opened with a wellknown discussion of the “dangers of a delusive exactness in the
164
application of the Fourteenth Amendment.” By 1921, this was a
standard reply to class-legislation arguments—but a reply that did not
meet the objection. It assumed, instead, that class legislation implied
precision of classification alone; to say that laws were difficult to write
in precise ways said nothing about whether labor had obtained an
unfair upper hand in the legislature, dealing themselves benefits
denied others.
In the end, Holmes simply rejected the political fears of the
165
majority : he insisted that the Court could not treat majorities as
factions if there was a reasonable claim that they had acted in service
of the public. If reasonable persons could support labor’s claims, then
the Court had to treat them as a majority, not as a special interest,
seeking to legislate themselves benefits. “If, as many intelligent
people believe, there is more danger that the injunction will be
abused in labor cases than elsewhere I can feel no doubt of the power
166
of the legislature to deny it in such cases.” This embodies the police
167
power–general purpose response to class legislation seen in Holden,
168
in Matthews, and in so many other cases: there was a reasonable
basis for the classification, and that was it.
Corrigan was one of the last significant cases involving class
legislation, but it was not alone. Just as Yick Wo demonstrated, class
legislation could provide benefits to minorities who were deprived of
169
a right to work. This occurred as late as 1926 in Yu Cong Eng v.
170
Trinidad (The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases). The Supreme Court
ruled in favor of a Chinese merchant in the Philippine Islands,
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 343.
See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad (The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases), 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
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enjoining enforcement of an act making it a crime to keep business
171
records in anything except English, Spanish, or any local dialect.
The ruling was based both on due process and equal protection.
Quoting Holden v. Hardy, the Court summarized the issue: “The
question in each case is whether the legislature had adopted the
statute in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be
a mere excuse for an unjust discrimination, or the oppression, or
172
spoliation of a particular class.” In its final, concluding paragraph,
the Court invoked Truax v. Raich as an analogous case:
As against the Chinese merchants of the Philippines, we think the
present law, which deprives them of something indispensable to the
carrying on of their business, and is obviously intended chiefly to
affect them as distinguished from the rest of the community, is a
173
denial to them of the equal protection of the laws.

Corrigan, Raich, and The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases were not
the only cases that the Supreme Court heard and in which it struck
down a classification as unjust discrimination during the 1920s. In
174
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania the Supreme Court, over
strong dissents, struck down a tax on taxicab services organized as
corporations on the theory that exempting some taxicab services
175
organized as individuals or partnerships was arbitrary. In Power
176
Manufacturing Co. v. Saunders, the Court struck down venue
provisions allowing a corporation to be sued in a county where it did
no business on the theory that the statute discriminated against
177
foreign corporations. In Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Road
178
Improvement District No. 6, the Court concluded that a propertyassessment law discriminated in a “palpable” manner because it did
179
not treat “railroad companies . . . like individual owners.” There was

171. Id. at 508, 524–25.
172. Id. at 526 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 398 (1898)).
173. Id. at 527–28.
174. Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 (1928).
175. Id. at 402 (“In effect § 23 divides those operating taxicabs into two classes. The gross
receipts of incorporated operators are taxed, while those of natural persons and partnerships
carrying on the same business are not. . . . The tax is imposed merely because the owner is a
corporation.”).
176. Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (1927).
177. Id. at 494 (“So we conclude that the special classification and discriminatory treatment
of foreign corporations are without reasonable basis and essentially arbitrary.”).
178. Kan. City S. Ry. Co. v. Rd. Improvement Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1921).
179. Id. at 661.
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even an occasional case on racial discrimination: in Nixon v.
180
Herndon, the Court struck down the Texas white-primary law under
the Fourteenth Amendment in ringing praise that reality mocked:
[T]he law in the States shall be the same for the black as for the
white: that all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for
whose protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of their
181
color.

In this era, as was true of earlier eras, far more of these
challenges were rejected than affirmed. In a vast number of cases,
corporations, associations, and individuals claimed that rules and
182
regulations violated their equal protection rights. There were cases,

180. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
181. Id. at 541 (quoting Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 77 (1917)).
182. This was true of cases in the federal courts. See, e.g., Herbring v. Lee, 280 U.S. 111, 116
(1929) (reporting the petitioner’s argument that a licensing requirement violated “class
legislation”); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 370–71 (1927) (rejecting the petitioner’s
argument that a criminal syndicalism statute was “class legislation”); Twohy Bros. Co. v.
Kennedy, 295 F. 462, 465–67 (9th Cir. 1924) (rejecting a claim that a law holding an employer
liable for injuries arising from conditions of a hazardous occupation violated equal protection);
Berlet v. Lehigh Valley Silk Mills, 287 F. 769, 771 (3d Cir. 1923) (affirming the state supreme
court’s decision that a law giving a lien to “throwsters” of silk on silk thrown, retained, and
returned was class legislation); C. A. Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 266 F. 785, 791–94 (2d Cir.
1920) (involving a challenge to the Lever Act as unconstitutional “class legislation”); Gloucester
Seafood Workers’ Ass’n v. Houston, 35 F.2d 193, 196 (E.D. Va. 1929) (rejecting a classlegislation argument); Liberty Highway Co. v. Mich. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 294 F. 703, 709 (E.D.
Mich. 1923) (rejecting a class-legislation argument attacking regulation of common carriers).
This was true as well in the state courts. See, e.g., Franchise Motor Freight Ass’n v. Seavey, 235
P. 1000, 1003–04 (Cal. 1925) (upholding a class-legislation challenge to regulatory exemption);
Ex parte Rameriz, 226 P. 914, 920 (Cal. 1924) (rejecting a class-legislation challenge to excluding
aliens from gun ownership); Montgomery v. Town of Branford, 147 A. 9, 10–11 (Conn. 1929)
(striking down a tax as violating the rule of equal protection and class legislation); Territory v.
Armstrong, 28 Haw. 88, 93–97 (1924) (rejecting an argument that an adultery statute violated
class legislation and equal protection because it treated men and women differently); Ex parte
Bottjer, 260 P. 1095, 1096 (Idaho 1927) (rejecting an argument that a statute applying only to
bankers was improper class legislation); Smallwood v. Jeter, 244 P. 149, 155 (Idaho 1926)
(rejecting a challenge that exempting school buses violates class legislation); People v. Sheldon,
152 N.E. 567, 568–69 (Ill. 1926) (rejecting a class-legislation challenge to a concealed-weapon
law); Fountain Park Co. v. Hensler, 155 N.E. 465, 468 (Ind. 1927) (striking down a statute that
granted eminent domain power to a religious entity as improper class legislation); City of
Springfield v. Smith, 19 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. 1929) (striking down a statute barring the showing of
motion pictures on Sundays as class legislation); City of Seattle v. Gervasi, 258 P. 328, 332
(Wash. 1927) (rejecting an argument that a statute that barred selling groceries on Sunday was
class legislation).
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183

like Terrace v. Thompson, in which the Court seemed to defy its
protection of aliens in Raich, ruling in favor of California’s racist bans
on Japanese land ownership (on the theory that the discrimination
was supported by the police power, the potential harm being land
184
ownership by noncitizens). Indeed, there are cases that we today
find inhumane, such as Buck v. Bell, in which the Supreme Court in
1927 upheld forced sterilization and rejected equal protection with
185
the back of its hand —even though equality was the best argument
available against the sterilization statute and had influenced a number
186
of state supreme courts to strike down such laws. In Buck, Justice
Holmes who was openly disdainful of a priori claims of right and
equality, issued the famous line that equality was the “usual last
187
resort” of constitutional lawyers, not because there were no equality
188
cases, but because there were too many.
II. HISTORICAL IMPLICATIONS
The legal history of judicial doctrine is always subject to the
historian’s skeptical nostrum that it is “law-office history.” But this is
not the standard history of doctrine; it is the history of the average
legal consciousness of the day, rather than the “leading” controversial
case that colors the lenses of the practicing constitutionalist solving
twenty-first-century problems. This history disrupts conventional
scholarly wisdom that equal protection fell into “desuetude” for
189
eighty years, when in fact there were a surfeit of cases. As the great
historian of science, Professor Thomas Kuhn, once admonished his
students, it is precisely when the incomprehensible rears its head that
190
time reveals how much has been forgotten. It is only because of the

183. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
184. Id. at 217.
185. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
186. NOURSE, supra note 5, at 28, 185 nn.35–36; Stephen A. Siegel, Justice Holmes, Buck v.
Bell, and the History of Equal Protection, 90 MINN. L. REV. 106, 108, 124–31 (2005).
187. Buck, 274 U.S. at 208.
188. See supra notes 17, 94 and 118.
189. Tussmann & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 341.
190. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC
TRADITION AND CHANGE xii (1977) (“When reading the works of an important thinker, look
first for the apparent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have
written them. When you find an answer, . . . when those passages make sense, then you may find
that more central passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their
meaning.”).
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191

relentless presentism of legal practice, which requires looking for
cases with modern fact patterns (of race and sex and disability), that
lawyers and scholars forget that different equality cases once existed.
As the United States’ leading historiographer of law, Professor
Bob Gordon, has explained, lawyers tend to “treat the past as existing
on a timeless horizontal plane with the present: Past texts and
practices are to be read exactly in their times as they are in
192
ours . . . .” This demands indifference to the past as well as the
present; as Professor Reva Siegel urges, the past preserves itself
193
through transformation. We believe this operates as well in reverse:
the present preserves itself in the past by recasting the past in its own
image. Legal institutions cover and even erase the past to increase the
authority of their pronouncements, to render law timeless and
transcendent. One is tempted to think this is all a problem of the
normative cast of legal scholarship, but we believe this phenomenon
is structured presentism—a presentism demanded by and embedded
within the system of precedent that requires that one find, in the past,
words that quite literally precede themselves.

191. Presentism, as used by historians, refers to the tendency to look at the past through
contemporary eyes: for example, judging Henry Ford’s Model T by the standards of modern
300-horsepower engines. As Professor Larry Kramer has quipped, no historical effort is ever
immune from presentism. Larry Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2006)
(“Historians are all and always presentist.”). Yet, if a certain presentism is inevitable, historians
are at least trained to be conscious of their own temporal biases; lawyers are trained to be
oblivious to their temporal biases. The very structure of precedent makes presentism far more
insistent for lawyers than for historians. Lawyers are taught to read cases as if they had no time,
as if the words of 1861 could be immediately translated into the words of 1961. There are virtues
to this, but there are also vices, and the vices include a structured forgetting of concepts that
have no analogue in the present. It is precisely because judicial review is so taken for granted,
for example, that no one would have thought, before Kramer’s book, that the “people
themselves” might have exercised this power. Resisting presentism in this sense can enable law
to engage in discovery, asking new questions that the present cannot think to ask. See LARRY
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
8 (2004) (noting that “final interpretive authority rested with ‘the people themselves’” and
surmising that by studying this period of popular constitutionalism, “we may find some reasons
to reawaken our own seemingly deadened sensibilities in this respect”).
192. Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: The Arrival of Critical Historicism, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1023, 1023 (1997).
193. We see the move here as bidirectional. Doctrinal change tends to preserve the past, as
Professor Siegel has so compellingly documented. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1113 (1997). But doctrine and precedent also tend to preserve the present in the past, tending to
take present controversies and transforming them into past ones, even if the past is radically
different. See Nourse, supra note 84 (manuscript at 3).
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The history of class legislation is important for a number of
scholarly controversies precisely because it disrupts the present’s
conventional wisdom of equality law’s history. And, disrupting that
history, it offers new insights about old debates. First, as we show, this
history suggests that the most important scholarly contributions to
modern equal protection law—such as the underinclusive and
overinclusive rules of logical classification suggested by Professors
194
Tussman and tenBroek’s 1949 article —depend on a false history.
Equality law has not always been about classification simpliciter, as
opposed to classification as a signal of some greater principle of
governance. Second, this history corrects the record on recent
historical debates: some have used the history of equality law, and in
particular class legislation, to support a new revisionist history of
substantive due process. If our history is correct, this effort has been
misdirected and is based on a fundamental doctrinal confusion
between equal protection and due process. Third, this history sees
continuities where most assume discontinuity. Equality aspired to
political theory long before Professor John Hart Ely, United States v.
195
196
Carolene Products Co., and public choice theory; since the
Founding, equality has imbibed and reflected political theory
(whether good, bad, or incoherent). Fourth, this history implies
misdirection: the endless debates about the intentions of the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment may be misguided if equality is
grounded in basic notions of governance predating the amendment.

194. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1; see also infra notes 198–205.
195. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
196. Professor John Hart Ely is considered the author of a political-process theory of
constitutional review that seeks to justify the use of judicial review to reinforce the
representation of minorities. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 87–88 (1980) (summarizing “three arguments in favor of a participationoriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review”). Carolene Products, 304 U.S.
144 (1938), set forth an early version of this view in the most famous footnote in constitutional
law, which states that the Court may exercise greater powers of review when minorities do not
have sufficient political power to make their views effective in the political process, id. at 153
n.4. Some constitutionalists, such as Professor Geoffrey Miller, have argued that class legislation
reflected an early version of modern public choice theory, which posits that government exists
to benefit special interests. E.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special
Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83, 85, 124–26, 127 n.277
(1989).
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A. Equality as a Matter of Classification
One of the great tropes of equality law is that equality is a matter
of classification and that legislatures have a large discretion in
197
classification generally. This implies a particular idea of equality as
a matter of logic and language. This ideal was substantially reinforced
by one of the most important articles on equal protection written in
the twentieth century, Professors Tussman and tenBroek’s 1949
article, The Equal Protection of the Laws. The basic concepts found in
that article—of under- and overinclusive categories, of substantive
equal protection, and forbidden or “suspect” classification—became
the heart of equal protection analysis in the last half of the twentieth
198
century.
Professors Tussman and tenBroek reimagined equal protection
law as a question of “fit” between the statute’s purpose and its
categories, offering what appeared a more sophisticated way to
analyze statutory classifications (under- or overexclusion) and one
that incorporated the legal process theories of the day that focused on
199
the “purpose” of statutes. And, yet, their account almost completely
obscured the history we have recounted. The authors open with the
claim we have shown to be false, that the Equal Protection Clause
200
had, for eighty years fallen into “relative desuetude.” At one point,
the authors advert to “special” or class legislation but misstate the
doctrine as one of “reasonable classification”; from there they move
to a very modern idea, defining reasonableness as “the degree of [the
201
statute’s] success in treating similarly those similarly situated.”
By offering a method (analysis of classifications) for equal
protection cases, Professors Tussman and tenBroek obscured the
inchoate, often conflicting, but nevertheless real attempts by courts to
imbue equal protection with political theory. In place of links
between majorities and minorities or oppressed and privileged
minorities, Tussman and tenBroek gave scholars diagrams of traits
202
and mischiefs. In the place of liberty as a baseline from which
exemptions seemed suspect was the notion that substantive equality

197. See generally John Marquez Lundin, Making Equal Protection Analysis Make Sense, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1191 (1999) (tracing the history of equal protection).
198. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 356.
199. Id. at 346–48.
200. Id. at 341.
201. Id. at 343–44.
202. See id. at 347 (diagrams).
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was the “equality” version of the by-then highly discredited,
203
substantive due process. In the place of the fears of aristocracy or
socialism, which once appeared near the surface of judicial opinions
204
on equal protection, came a diagnostic tool of seemingly great
205
power aspiring to logical purity. If our history is right, not only did
Tussman and tenBroek recount a partial history, but they also missed
the very importance of equal protection: its aspirations to political
theory rather than formal classification.
B. Class Legislation as Political Theory
If this history takes equal protection out of the shadows of
modern fixations on classificatory logic, it also reveals something
important about the history of equality law. Equality has always
aspired to something larger than a logical system of classification.
Long before Carolene Products, long before Professor John Hart Ely,
courts and commentators worried about legislatures’ tendencies to
206
deal out benefits to their friends and burdens to their enemies. In
this sense, class legislation is the oddly architectured precursor to the
political process theories of the late-twentieth century, whether
theories of public choice or representation reinforcement. As
Professor Michael Klarman has noted, political-process theories have
207
been extraordinarily resilient. What many have failed to appreciate
is just how old they might be; indeed, they are prefigured in the
doctrine of class legislation.
In hindsight, class legislation joined two otherwise potentially
incompatible political prescriptions. On the one hand, it attempted to
protect minorities from majorities, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins or Truax
v. Raich. This was a kind of antiaristocracy rule. On the other hand,
courts saw no difference between deploying this concept as a sword
203. Id. at 361–65.
204. See supra note 112.
205. Professors Tussman and tenBroek recognize at one point that there was a “theory of
legislation and the state” at stake in equal protection but explicitly reject what they called “the
pressure group theory,” urging that this theory was incompatible with equal protection.
Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 1, at 350. One (although not the only) way of reading this
otherwise opaque passage is that the authors were rejecting the use of equal protection to police
the legislature against capture by concentrated interests. In short, to the extent that the authors
recognized that larger claims were at issue, they rejected them.
206. See supra notes 22–34 and accompanying text.
207. See generally Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory,
77 VA. L. REV. 747, 830 (1991) (“[P]olitical process theory is the only promising constitutional
theory on the table . . . . ”).
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against racial oppression and as a shield from business regulation.
Class legislation helped to strike down at least some discriminations
against minorities, but it also helped strike down laws that came to be
associated with majorities. Some scholars dispute this, arguing that
class legislation reflected a proto–public choice doctrine designed to
prevent groups from legislating themselves monopolies, based on the
assumption that most legislation is inefficient and therefore rent
208
seeking. But if one is in the business of picking future analogues, it
is just as likely that class legislation was a precursor, in cases like Yick
Wo, Raich, or The Chinese Bookkeeping Cases, to cases in which the
Court limited its legislative supervision to monopolistic practices
affecting insular minorities. In this latter sense, the doctrine can be
seen as an early signal of what would flower in Carolene Products.
To be sure, analogizing class legislation to modern political
theories poses risks of presentism. The very idea of class legislation,
both in the doctrinal and the public sphere, changed radically over the
period we have recounted. In its earliest manifestations, class
legislation aimed to prevent legislatively granted monopolies. But
these efforts quickly foundered: class legislation did not reliably pick
out special interest legislation or even monopolistic legislation—if it
209
had, The Slaughterhouse Cases should have come out the other way.
The blatant protectionism of the anti-margarine law upheld in Powell
210
v. Pennsylvania should have led to reversal if class legislation had
been successful in striking down laws that reflected rent-seeking
211
behavior.
Early twentieth century equality law borrowed a variety of ideas
that do not fit precisely within either the modern public choice or
political-process formats. Courts did not distinguish between big
212
business and minority groups as political players; both could be
213
“victims” of the political process. For example, labor was often
208. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 196, at 124–26, 127 n.277.
209. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36 (1872) (rejecting a challenge to a New
Orleans butcher monopoly).
210. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
211. See Miller, supra note 196, at 85–86. Nor can one say that class legislation was
invariably antiredistributive; much regulation was upheld under the notion that even if it
classified, it fell within the police power. See supra Part I.
212. See supra Part I.B.
213. Political-process theories in constitutional law justify judicial review to protect
minorities, see ELY, supra note 196, at 97–88; public choice theories urge that democracy is
flawed because it allows minority interests to obtain benefits at the expense of latent majorities,
see generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
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painted as the great beneficiary of concentrated class politics. That
belief reflects the truth that both majorities and minorities are, in fact,
214
capable of acting as concentrated interests. It also reflects the
historical fact that when businesses invoked class legislation, they
were claiming to be the victims of feared state socialism, of rule by
215
the lower classes. On the other side of the coin, however, the old
class-legislation precedents were far more willing to evince
216
disapproval of laws that classified based on wealth (they frequently
217
expressed the need for one rule for the rich and poor ) in ways that
218
contemporary equal protection case law does not.
Ultimately, the country would grow intolerant of business’s
claims of political victimization; during the Great Depression, there
was a new acceptance of the harms to liberty from unemployment and
219
social insecurity due to old age and infirmity. With the twin
pressures of a president attempting to pack the Court and a Congress
trying to strip it of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court would adopt a
220
deferential attitude toward economic matters. As it would signal in
1938 in Carolene Products, the Court would limit its supervision of
the legislative process to cases in which it could be more confident of
majoritarian abuse—cases about free speech, religious bias, and the

Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991), reprinted in MAXWELL STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY 204, 206–12 (1997) (claiming that larger groups
have a more difficult time overcoming the free-rider problem than “smaller groups with
intensely interested members” who are “more likely to secure favorable government action”).
214. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 72–74 (1994).
215. See sources cited supra note 112.
216. See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 674 (1895) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
217. See sources cited supra note 112 (referring to laws that attempted to classify based on
wealth).
218. It is hornbook law that wealth classifications do not trigger strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.25, at 911 (7th ed.
2004) (“[Wealth classifications] have no relationship to values with constitutional recognition so
as to merit active judicial review under the strict scrutiny-compelling interest standard.”).
219. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 178 (2001).
220. ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 113–14 (noting that the New Deal Justices witnessed
Congress’s “popular repudiation” of the existing judicial understanding of the Constitution);
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 219 (1995) (“From 1937 on, the relationship among
the branches of government shifted dramatically, as an era of ‘judicial supremacy’ gave way to
deference by the Supreme Court to Congress.”); NOURSE, supra note 5, at 112–20 (describing
the pincer movement of the president and Congress).
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oppression of racial and ethnic minorities that loomed so large in the
221
years immediately prior to and during World War II.
C. Before the Fourteenth Amendment
Much scholarship on equality in the late-twentieth century has
222
struggled with the precise meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A good deal of effort has been made to marshal evidence about the
intent of the framers of the amendment to justify, for example, the
fact that various aspects of law that seem settled in 2009 were in fact
consistent or inconsistent with the history of the Fourteenth
223
Amendment. The history of class legislation disrupts this exercise
by revealing that the equality tradition in American law is a good deal
224
older than the Civil War.
The idea that governance and equality are inextricably
intertwined in a democracy reaches back to the Founding. The
Declaration of Independence grounds its claims to political freedom
225
on equality. More importantly, a form of equality is embedded,
quite literally, in the U.S. Constitution. A government “by the
people”—one that rejects rule by aristocracy or monarchy—is a
government built on the foundation of equal citizenship.
Montesquieu once wrote that the love of democracy was the love of
226
equality. A government built on the sovereign power of the people
assumes that, even if people are not equal to each other in attributes

221. NOURSE, supra note 5, at 142–44.
222. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (1955); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 6 (1955).
223. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 933, 933 (1984) (discussing different positions on the original intent of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947 passim (1995); Saunders, supra note 7, at 246–48 (arguing that, as it was
originally understood, the Equal Protection Clause did not “giv[e] all persons a substantive
constitutional right not to be dealt with by the state on the basis of their race” but rather
“forbade the state to single out any person or group of persons for special benefits or burdens
without an adequate ‘public purpose’ justification”).
224. See NELSON, supra note 23, at 13 (acknowledging a “popular ideology of liberty and
equality [that] existed in antebellum America. . . . from which section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment was ultimately derived”).
225. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
226. 1 M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 45 (J.V.
Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914) (1748) (“In monarchies and despotic
governments, nobody aims at equality; this does not so much as enter their thoughts . . . .”).
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or fortune, that they are equal as citizens. Class legislation sought to
animate this ideal long before the Fourteenth Amendment was
228
conceived.
Because equality is embedded within the structure of the U.S.
Constitution, in Articles I’s and II’s notions of representation, its
spirit transcends the Bill of Rights. Equality is not limited to what
Professor Robin West has called the “adjudicated Constitution,” the
229
rules that courts use to decide cases. Equality is not only an
individual right: because it is entrenched in the structure and
operation of the political departments, representatives in the political
branches—and the judiciary when it reviews them—have a duty to
promote equality. As the history of class legislation demonstrates,
equality is a matter of legislation as much as of adjudication.
D. The Lochner Debates
Since 1990, Lochner revisionism has generated a veritable
cottage industry of claims about equal protection as the real, and
more palatable, explanation for the Court’s Lochner-era substantive
230
due process decisions. This approach was inspired by Professor
Howard Gillman’s book, The Constitution Besieged, which argues that
courts were seeking neutrality and generality in imposing substantive
231
due process, a position grounded in ideas of class legislation. A
variety of historians and legal scholars, such as Professor G. Edward
White, have gone so far as to suggest that Lochner itself can be
described as a class-legislation decision (they are right that it was in
227. Brown, supra note 1, at 1497; Victoria Nourse, The Vertical Separation of Powers, 49
DUKE L.J. 749, 751–52 (1999) (positing the vertical relation of citizen to government is the
central engine of the separation of powers); V.F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional
Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 840 (2004) (extending that argument).
228. See, e.g., Vanzant v. Waddell, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 263–64 (1829); see also GILLMAN,
supra note 25, at 22 (describing measures designed to stop special interest legislation a century
before the Lochner era); NELSON, supra note 23, at 13–21 (describing efforts to legislate class
equality at federal and state levels in the mid-nineteenth century); Saunders, supra note 7, at 285
(referencing “the antebellum state constitutional principle against partial or special laws”).
229. Robin West, Katrina, The Constitution, and the Legal Question Doctrine, 81 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2006).
230. For a review of some of the revisionism, see generally Bernstein, supra note 13;
Friedman, History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty; Gary D. Rowe, Lochner Revisionism
Revisited, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 221 (1999). In the historical literature, this move begins a
good deal earlier.
231. GILLMAN, supra note 25, at 10 (“[I]t is my contention that the [Lochner-era decisions]
represented a serious, principled effort to maintain . . . [a] distinction between valid economic
regulation . . . and invalid ‘class’ legislation . . . .”).
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fact argued as a class-legislation case, although not decided as one).
Some assert that this is the accepted view among historians (even if
233
most lawyers and even most constitutionalists would never know it).
These claims have in turn generated counterrevisionist arguments,
such as that by Professor Barry Friedman, that these historians have
simply found their “friends” and forgotten the ways in which critics
234
saw Lochner at the time. In short, commentators have spilled a
good deal of ink on the assumption that class legislation is a doctrine
of substantive due process that has the potential to rescue Lochner
from doctrinal infamy.
Much of this debate depends on the claim that class legislation
was a doctrine of substantive due process. That categorical judgment
is too simple. Class legislation was also a very important doctrine of
equal protection. This descriptive reality has largely been ignored by
historians in the great Lochner debates and it is a serious omission,
particularly from those who claim to be providing a “descriptive”
235
account of the doctrine. Put in other words, the political scientists
and historians who have adopted the class-legislation theory of
substantive due process risk confusing what constitutionalists view as
a basic doctrinal distinction between due process and equal
protection. To be sure, these doctrines were intertwined in the early
part of the twentieth century, but lawyers and judges believed that
236
there were important constitutional differences. This leaves some
residue of due process unexplained by class-legislation theory. At the
very least, this history calls into question any historical quick fix to
modern substantive due process dilemmas. Professor David Bernstein
may be right that historians and political scientists take this view to be
237
gospel, but it seems highly unlikely that constitutionalists (who will
make no mistake between an equal protection and a due process

232. White, supra note 16, at 101–03.
233. Bernstein, supra note 13, at 19.
234. Friedman, History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, supra note 84, at 1402–28.
235. Among the vast number of articles debating Lochner, there is one exception to this
omission: David E. Bernstein, Essays: Fifty Years After Bolling v. Sharpe: Bolling, Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Lochnerphobia, 93 GEO. L.J. 1253 (2005).
236. See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 331–39 (1921) (discussing the doctrines of
equal protection and due process, and the distinctions between them).
237. See Bernstein, supra note 13, at 13–15.
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claim) will be easily persuaded that a theory of equal protection can
238
somehow solve the Lochner problem.
III. MODERN EQUALITY THEORY AND PRACTICE
If the early-twentieth-century history of equality law disrupts the
conventional history, it also has implications for equality theory and
practice. A number of constitutionalists, most recently Professor Jack
Balkin, have sought to revive class legislation as an equal protection
239
ideal. There are many wise reasons for this shift in rhetoric, but we
caution those invoking the term that the history of this idea was one
of both promise and failure. To successfully reinvigorate class
legislation, scholars would have to develop its supporting governance
theory in a way earlier advocates never did. As we explain, the “new”
class legislation must imagine itself as part of a much richer theory of
abuse of legislative power. It must become a rule of legislation rather
than adjudication. In that spirit, we offer a proposal for a
“convergence-forcing” view of equal protection.
A. A More Attractive Ideal?
240

Many constitutionalists believe that equality law is unraveling.
Scholars have been relentlessly critical of the Supreme Court’s
requirement that, in facially neutral cases, the claimant must show
241
“intent” to discriminate. Complaints about the conventional tiered
model of equal protection—which requires a high level of judicial
scrutiny in some cases whereas only an intermediate or low level in
242
others—are legion and growing; so are significant departures from

238. One of us has the view, expressed elsewhere, that the Lochner “problem” has been
made into a problem for moderns based on a false view of the nature of right; moderns read
back into the past a contemporary notion of right that cannot fairly describe the average
doctrinal consciousness of the early part of the twentieth century. See Nourse, supra note 84
(manuscript at 2–3, 44–46).
239. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 855 (“[L]imits on abortion are a form of class
legislation . . . .”); Saunders, supra note 7, at 301 (arguing that important aspects of the Equal
Protection Clause’s background were lost to modern interpreters).
240. See generally Goldberg, supra note 1 (questioning whether the three-tiered equal
protection framework is still needed); Siegel, supra note 193 (describing the stratifying effects of
facially neutral state action).
241. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 494; Siegel, supra note 193, at 1113; Sklansky supra
note 8, at 1306–11.
242. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 1, at 484 (“[T]he problems with the three-tiered
framework for judicial scrutiny are sufficient to warrant immediate consideration of an
alternative standard for review.”); Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution: Unlocking
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the standard doctrine, as the gay rights cases of Romer v. Evans and
244
245
Lawrence v. Texas demonstrate. Most constitutionalists know that
the doctrine they teach is in large part false: it is hornbook law that
246
wealth classifications do not yield heightened scrutiny, yet it is also
true that wealth can be enough to strike down a law that deprives one
247
248
of the right to vote or the right to an appeal; similarly, distinctions
249
that do not merit strict scrutiny, such as mental retardation, can in
250
fact trigger stringent review.
The gay rights cases, as most
constitutionalists know, signal a major shift in constitutional doctrine
251
away from the traitist model. Indeed, Romer signals that class
252
legislation may be a part of the future of a new equal protection.

Human Potential in Grutter and Lawrence, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 104 (2003) (noting
that Lawrence and Grutter call into question the stability of traditional equal protection
standards of review); Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 970 (2004) (observing that “[w]e are now uncertain about the utility” of
traditional equal protection classifications). For early criticism, see generally Jeffrey M.
Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 161, 163 (1984) (“[T]he system of multi-level scrutiny has suffered serious strains, which
may reveal that it is fundamentally flawed and destined to collapse.”).
243. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
244. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
245. Neither of the two most important gay rights cases of the past decade used standard
tiered analysis. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority
applied an “unheard-of form of rational-basis review”); Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of failing to employ “normal ‘rational basis’ analysis”); see
also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (recommending a single standard because, “[i]n fact, our cases have not delineated
three—or even one or two—such well-defined standards” and arguing that, “[r]ather, our cases
reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing classifications”); id. at 460 (Marshall, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part) (“I have long believed the level of scrutiny employed in an
equal protection case should vary with ‘the constitutional and societal importance of the interest
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn.’” (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting))). For an argument that equality law has been subsumed under
the idea of liberty, see generally Brown, supra note 1.
246. See supra note 218.
247. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (“[C]lassifications which
might invade or restrain [voting rights] must be closely scrutinized . . . .”).
248. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13, 19–20 (1956) (holding that indigent persons must
be furnished with free copies of trial transcripts necessary to file an appeal).
249. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (declining to apply heightened scrutiny to review laws
dealing with mental retardation).
250. See id. at 447–50 (refusing to defer to the state’s proffered rationales and instead
probing the strength and reasonableness of those rationales).
251. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due
Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 136–38 (2007) (noting a trend away from equal protection
categories); see also Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (2004)
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At least in part in response to these problems, a few lonely and
brave scholars have attempted to revive the class-legislation ideal as a
solution to modern equality problems. Professor Melissa Saunders
has argued that class legislation could resolve modern voting rights
253
cases; Professor Mark Yudof has invoked class legislation to
254
understand sex discrimination case law. And, most provocatively,
Professor Jack Balkin has argued that class legislation is likely to
inform the Supreme Court’s reproductive rights jurisprudence: that
equality, in class-legislation form, could help resolve the seemingly
255
great constitutional issue of the early twenty-first century, abortion.
There are many reasons to believe that class legislation is in fact
a much more attractive idea of equal protection than the standard
antidiscrimination and anticlassification models offer. First, class
legislation scrutinizes laws that establish hierarchies among groups,
256
which follows intuitive ideas of equality better than perfect proxies
or levels of scrutiny. This mirrors the terracing that makes
subordination a much more attractive equality model than a standard
that demands sameness simpliciter (sameness in what respect?).
Second, class legislation has more of the look of a disparate-impact
standard than one might suspect: the analysis not only considers
actual (as opposed to linguistic) burdens but also asks whether those
257
burdens are justified by a public purpose (the police-power inquiry).
Third, class legislation shifts the debate away from the notion of an
equality law limited to some special sets of persons marked by race,
sex, or illegitimacy. Traitism (the tendency to reduce equality to
particular physical or social traits) invites repetitive arguments about
special rights and resentment by those who do not appear to share the

(contending that Lawrence “mark[s] the emergence of a new approach in substantive due
process analysis”).
252. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“[C]lass legislation . . . [is] obnoxious to
the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
24 (1883))).
253. Saunders, supra note 7, at 327.
254. Yudof, supra note 7, at 1387–407.
255. Balkin, supra note 7, at 855–63.
256. Cf. Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1455–77 (2000)
(discussing ideals of perfect proxy conception).
257. The vast majority of cases in which class-legislation claims were made failed because
there was a public purpose for the classification. This mirrors the inquiry in disparate impact
cases about whether there is a common justification for the disparate impact. Special thanks to
Professor Martha Fineman for making this point to us.
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258

preferred traits. More importantly, it forsakes the great ideal of
equality law which protects all persons, not particular people or
particular classes. In that spirit, the class-legislation idea holds out the
possibility of moving beyond a particular list of strictly scrutinized
259
traits to a postidentity, postformal inequality analysis.
If class legislation has a number of attractive features, it also
poses risks. If it becomes a standard focused on identifying instances
of singling out, which the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans
260
suggests, then it is unlikely to do much. First, all law singles out. As
the history of class legislation demonstrates, over time, this truth can
easily swallow equality’s larger aspirations. Second, singling out
depends on a common baseline that may be highly contested
(equality is an inherently comparative norm). The less-than-rosy
history of class legislation indicates that the doctrine could repeat this
261
pattern unless the appropriate baseline is elaborated. As the work
of Professors Cass Sunstein, Peter Westen, and Ken Simons on
262
baselines in constitutional law has demonstrated, one of the
persistent problems in equality theory is the failure to describe the
baseline from which one is making a comparison. As the history of
class legislation developed, this baseline problem was solved in
individual cases by using a liberty interest as the baseline, when
liberty meant an activity universally shared (then, the claim of free
labor). This union of liberty and equality may sound dangerous to
263
some, but, as Professors Kenneth Karst and Pam Karlan have
264
argued, the union of these claims may be stronger constitutionally

258. We are thinking here of rhetoric surrounding affirmative action cases.
259. On the ambiguities of wealth classifications, see supra note 14.
260. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
261. The great debates about labor and capital often depended on a baseline of business
victimization that most today would find strange.
262. See Simons, Equality, supra note 130 passim; Simons, Egalitarian Norms, supra note
130 passim; Sunstein, supra note 130, at 883–902; Westen, supra note 130 passim.
263. Professor Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that the clauses are aimed at different
goals and that the analysis therefore must be independent. Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Sexual
Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal
Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988).
264. See Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection, Due Process, and the Stereoscopic Fourteenth
Amendment, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 473, 474 (2002) (“[T]he ideas of equality and liberty
expressed in the equal protection and due process clauses each emerge from and reinforce the
other.”); Karst, supra note 251 passim (describing how egalitarian values furthered the
development of substantive due process).
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than their parts. The reason for that, we believe, is that it helps to
265
solve the baseline problem.
If class legislation is to provide anything but a classification
standard, we believe scholars should take a more intensive look at the
doctrine’s aims and assumptions. Class legislation’s ideals require
courts to do what they never explicitly did—to elaborate a theory of
unequal legislation. Based on an analogy to corporate law, we suggest
a focus on majority abuse of legislative power. We propose a standard
that asks courts to force legislatures to link the fates of majorities and
minorities. We conclude by applying this model to the much-debated
100-to-1 disparity in crack and powder cocaine penalties.
B. Equality as a Convergence-Forcing Rule
The central feature of early-twentieth-century equal protection
doctrine was the desire to prevent favoritism in legislation: “the
minority are safe, [if] the majority, who make the law, are operated
266
on by it equally with the others.” This reflects both ancient and
modern common sense, as shown by work from a wide array of
scholars from Professors Derrick Bell to John Rawls to Rebecca
Brown. For majorities to protect minorities, they must see it in their
interest, and, to see it in their interest, they must consider themselves
267
in the shoes of the minority. To make this a reality and more than a
268
theory, however, there must be a “linkage-forcing” move.

265. It also makes sense, not as a principle of textual classification, but as a statement about
the dynamics of the legislative process. Indeed, the notion that legislatures have the incentive to
foist off burdens onto the few was predicted by the moderate New Deal warrior and opponent
of Lochnerism, Justice Robert Jackson. See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The framers of the Constitution knew . . . that there is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to
require that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a minority must be imposed
generally.”).
266. Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 606 (1831); see also, e.g., Ward v.
Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 123 (Vt. 1825). In Ward, counsel argued, “If the legislature have power to
select any individual, as the object of particular legislation, and exempt him from obligations to
which all others are subject, it may be the instrument of the grossest favouritism; or, in times of
political excitement, of the most cruel persecution.” Id.
267. See Bell, supra note 37, at 523 (describing this “interest convergence” in the context of
school desegregation); Brown, supra note 1, at 1515–23 (describing this “communion of
interest” and the role it played in late eighteenth-century America); John Rawls, Justice as
Fairness, in COLLECTED PAPERS 47, 49–52 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
268. By “linkage-forcing” move, we refer to a move that would force majorities to address
what they are likely to be indifferent to—the fate of rules that are likely to affect only
minorities.
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The class-legislation ideal never had a coherent political theory
(it was in some cases focused on monopoly, in others on mob-like
majorities) but its original premise—that a democracy cannot have
one rule for the rich and another for the poor, one for the majority
and another for the minority—invites questions about the
representational duties of a majority to a minority. More specifically,
269
it invites an inquiry about abuse of majority representation. Taking
cues from standard principal-agent theory, and the duty of the
principal to the agent, we propose an inquiry that would ask whether
the majority had abused its power by deliberate indifference to the
interests of minorities.
The linkage-forcing move comes from viewing equality as a duty,
a fiduciary duty of the representative to all the representative’s
constituents. Just as a shareholder controlling the majority of votes
may not adopt rules locking out minorities or burdening them at the
270
expense of the corporation, the political representative may not
award benefits to a majority if the burdens are foisted entirely on a
minority, unless the entire polity receives countervailing benefits.
Similarly, in the elective sphere, one can characterize the
representational relationship as raising a conflict of interest between
271
majorities and minorities. The principal (the representative) stands
to benefit from supporting majority positions (by gaining reelection)
and by locking out minorities. Assuming that the representative has a
duty to represent all voters, just as corporate shareholders have a
duty to represent the best interest of the corporation as a whole,

269. In referring to an abuse of majoritarian power, we were inspired by the work of
Professor Yasmin Dawood in the election context. Yasmin Dawood, The Antidomination Model
and the Judicial Oversight of Democracy, 96 GEO. L. REV. 1411, 1428–38 (2008).
270. See, e.g., Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) (recognizing the
fiduciary duty of majority shareholders to minority shareholders); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (setting out the test for regulating self-dealing transactions that
benefit majority shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders); see also Zohar Goshen,
The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV.
393, 396–97, 399–400 (2003) (explaining the fiduciary duty of a majority shareholder to minority
shareholders and the rules governing self-dealing transactions that burden minority
shareholders at the expense of the majority shareholder).
271. Professor Rebecca Brown has argued that courts should ask, in both liberty and
equality cases, whether majorities would in fact apply the challenged rule to themselves (would
majorities really want, for example, the police to enforce prohibitions on sexual acts in their
own bedrooms, as opposed to someone else’s bedrooms?). See Brown, supra note 1, at 1493
(describing the “principle of equality” as “[m]ake any rules you want, as long as they apply to
everyone”). This proposal, we argue, reflects a larger concern for the potential for majority selfdealing; it should trigger the inquiry because it suggests majoritarian self-dealing.
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lockouts of minority interests raise questions of fairness and common
benefit. Corporate law addresses the self-dealing problem in several
ways, in some cases by requiring minority approval or sometimes by
272
requiring that the transaction be entirely fair to the whole.
This approach would require courts to act as deliberative
conscience: the aim would be to prevent entrenchment of majority
positions, which is to say deliberate indifference to rules that protect
majority interests at the expense of the liberty of minorities. Such an
anti-entrenchment rule would ask whether a reasonable person in the
burdened party’s shoes could say that the majority was trying to
entrench its status at the expense of the liberty of those to whom it
was indifferent. The lesson to be taken from the history of early
twentieth-century equality law is not a new moniker for what
273
Professor Robin West has called the “adjudicated Constitution” but
274
rather a movement toward an “embedded constitutionalism,” one
which seeks to force the active consideration and deliberation of
constitutional values in more powerful institutions—in this case, in
legislatures.
One might think of this as a vertical theory of equality in the
275
following sense. One is not trying, under equal protection, to create
linguistic or classificatory symmetry, to target the bad motives of
government actors, or to achieve equal outcomes. One envisions the
harm differently; it is a harm that embraces majorities’ abuses of
power in failing to represent minorities. Majorities always have the
incentive to self-deal, to garner benefits to themselves, and to
dispense burdens on others. A burden on liberty is a cue, a signal that
the law must be scrutinized to determine whether it is a guise to
perpetuate or to create inequality among citizens. This is particularly
important in cases in which the burden is imposed on those who have
historically been designated as lesser citizens. The idea recalls the
great Learned Hand formula in tort: multiply the likelihood of injury
276
by the cost of avoidance to yield negligence; here, multiply the
likelihood of serious burden by a history of second-class citizenship

272. See Goshen, supra note 270, at 396–97.
273. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
274. On embedded constitutionalism, see Scott & Holder, supra note 36, at 238–40; Desai,
supra note 36, at 590–94.
275. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 227, at 759 (grounding the departments in their “vertical”
relationships to the people).
276. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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and the inference grows that the governing majority has aimed to
perpetuate and entrench its winning hand.
We also suggest that it may be more important for courts, in
277
cases of democratic indifference, to act as catalysts —to provoke
representational responses rather than to strike down a law
simpliciter. For example, in implementing this ideal, courts might be
more successful developing a doctrine of “equality abstention.”
Assume that one has a case involving a persistent and pervasive racial
impact. In that case, the court would not strike down the law, but
would refuse to apply it unless Congress came back with a finding
that satisfied the general principal-agent standard: either the affected
minority voted to support the law, or Congress produced persuasive
evidence that the law was entirely fair to all, including the
disadvantaged racial minority. The court would abstain until the
278
legislature responded. This abstention would put the onus on the
legislature, where it belongs. It would lessen complaints of activist
judicial review because it would be deliberation-forcing rather than
279
inhibiting. If the legislature did not deliberate within a reasonable
time, then courts would not enforce the law (this sanction, in the case
of the criminal law, would almost ensure that there would be some
deliberation because criminal laws typically have strong majoritarian
salience and prosecutors have incentives to communicate such
280
decisions to Congress).

277. See, e.g., Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial
Role in New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565, 570–71 (2007).
278. Imagine the situation in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in which the
legislature had excluded itself (and other “high-class criminals”) from the scope of the law, id. at
537. The Court could have returned the law to the legislature, asking them to debate the
exclusion and provide data on the claimed “genetic” distinctions between habitual political
criminals and habitual chicken thieves. If the legislature failed to deliberate or failed to produce
the information and simply passed the law again, the Court should strike it down as an abuse of
majoritarian power.
279. Not all deliberation is good, as anyone who has ever been to a faculty meeting can
attest. The point of this rule is structured deliberation to produce better participation and
information. Closed groups tend to reaffirm the group’s views, increasing ill-informed and
prejudicial decisions. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA (2006) (describing the
problems of decisionmaking by groups isolated from outside information).
280. This follows not from any abstract logical proposition but rather from the demands of
crime politics. When, for example, an appellate court ruled that plea bargaining violated the
bribery statute, United States. v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343, 1357–58 (10th Cir. 1998) (decided
July 1, 1998), rev’d en banc, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999), Congress responded almost
immediately with proposals attacking the decision, Effective Prosecution and Public Safety Act
of 1998, S. 2311, 105th Cong. (1998) (introduced July 15, 1998) (noting the Tenth Circuit’s
decision and indicating that the bill was introduced in response to that decision); Safe Schools,
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Consider the example of the 100-to-1 difference in penalties
281
applied to crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. For some time, the
Sentencing Commission and scholars have worried that the statutory
282
difference results in significant racial impacts. As one leading
criminologist has explained,
No other feature of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been
viewed more critically than the 100:1 crack-powder cocaine disparity
built into the guidelines . . . . The disparity is particularly distressing
because crack defendants are primarily black and powder
defendants are primarily white and Hispanic, so the differential
treatment can too easily be seen as a manifestation of racial
discrimination. Thus, there have been efforts in many quarters to
call attention to this concern and to drastically diminish or eliminate
283
this disparity.

Equal protection law, however, provides no real basis to attack
the 100-to-1 ratio. Strict scrutiny does not apply because the law is
facially neutral on the question of race, and disparate impact analysis
only yields a finding of inequality if there is evidence that the law was
passed with the specific intent to harm minorities (a very unlikely
284
case today). The ancient ideal of class legislation does little better:
under the old rule, the question would be whether Congress had
made one rule for the rich and another for the poor, one for the white
Safe Streets, and Secure Borders Act of 1998, S. 2484, 105th Cong. § 2303 (introduced Aug. 16,
1998) (referring specifically to the decision in United States v. Singleton and offering findings
supporting prosecutorial deal making). Ultimately, these proposals were mooted when the
Tenth Circuit reversed itself when sitting en banc. See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1297 (decided Jan.
9, 1999).
281. See Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 566–68 (2007) (considering this
sentencing disparity under the federal Sentencing Guidelines).
282. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 8 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_
congress/cocaine2007.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 102–03 (2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/r_
congress/02crack/2002crackrpt.pdf; Sklansky, supra note 8, at 1288–89. The controversy has
been going on at least since 1995, when the Sentencing Commission first proposed to change the
crack-powder differential. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States
Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074 (May 10, 1995) (relevant portions rejected by Congress in Act of
Oct. 30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334).
283. Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The Data Tell Us
That It Is Time To Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2003).
284. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (“[T]he invidious quality of a law
claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory
purpose.”). On the difficulties with the original equal protection challenges, see Sklanksy, supra
note 8, at 1306–11.
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and one for the black. However inviting that question may be,
historically, the answers did not always favor those who would be
favored in 2009. Under the class-legislation theory of old, the police
power (the power to regulate general public safety, health, and
welfare) could trump equality concerns. As we have indicated,
although class-legislation ideals may confer some benefits, this case
shows the potential pitfalls: the police power has been used to support
a variety of practices viewed in 2009 as intolerable, such as racial
285
segregation.
We suggest a different inquiry: we would ask whether Congress
had satisfied its fiduciary duty to both the majority and the minority.
First, was there impartial evidence that Congress was deliberately
indifferent to the interests of the minority? Second, assuming that
286
there were such evidence,
was Congress’s statutory scheme
nevertheless justified by its entire fairness, or would the minority vote
287
to approve the practice? If minority voices in Congress subsequent
to the court ruling voted for the statute, the inquiry would be over. If
not, then the Congress should hold hearings to determine whether the
statute was entirely fair to the minority.
In our crack-powder cocaine example, courts should refuse to
apply the 100-to-1 penalty until Congress held a minority vote or
passed a resolution explaining why the penalty was nonetheless fair to
the minority. Because politicians consider crime very important and
because prosecutors have ready access to legislators, it seems unlikely
that legislators would ignore the threat of nonenforcement. At the
least, the resulting debate would be an improvement over a
jurisprudence that imagines equality as the “hostility” of
288
legislatures —because the real problem with entrenchment is

285. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–51 (1896) (explaining that the police
power would justify race discrimination unlike other discriminations, which were arbitrary); id.
at 545 (stating that antimiscegenation statutes were “within the police power of the State”).
286. There is a good deal of evidence, given the Sentencing Commissions’s persistent efforts
to change the rules, that Congress was deliberately indifferent to the effects of the rule on
minority populations. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 282, at 6–9.
287. Cf. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (holding that “entire
fairness” encompassed both “fair dealing” and “fair price”).
288. Indeed, one of the great ironies of equal protection law is that it relies on an intent
standard, see, e.g., Davis, 426 U.S. at 239–40, that elsewhere its advocates claim cannot exist; in
the sphere of statutory interpretation, for example, it is commonly said that collective bodies
like legislatures have no intent. Justice Scalia has argued that legislative intent does not exist,
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 32
(1997), and suggests that “under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed
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structured indifference and abuse of majoritarian power. Had
Congress been forced, on threat of holding the crack law
unenforceable, to explain in a reasoned way its specific choice of
penalties set at 100 to 1—as opposed to 50 to 1, or 20 to 1, or 3 to 1—
in light of its racial impacts, the debate would have been framed as
much in terms of equality as in soft and weak positions on crime. It
would have also provided minorities an incentive to voice their
approval or disapproval.
CONCLUSION
This Article has challenged the consensus position that the Equal
Protection Clause was moribund at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Equality arguments were once as banal to the average lawyer
as claims based on the right to contract or property (what lawyers
have come to call substantive due process claims). Most importantly,
the ideal of equality was not, even in an era long before politicalprocess theories, a matter of classification simpliciter. From before
the Civil War, and even during the Lochner era, equality aspired to a
theory of governance.
The lesson of the “lost” history of equal protection is not a form
of modernist originalism in which one resurrects the past to reform
the present. This is a history that aims to learn from the successes and
the failures of the past. Most Americans, we suspect, believe in the
ideal of class legislation: they believe that one rule should govern
both the rich and the poor (even if a constitutional lawyer would have
to explain that wealth classifications receive no special treatment).
How then is such a principle to be implemented in a world in which
courts believe equality is a matter of formal classification? The
answer is to rethink the context of the rule as much as the rule itself,
to rethink the ways in which this political ideal is institutionally
embedded. The judiciary has never been a great bastion of equality.
Indeed, this history shows that formal equality can protect those who
seem the least deserving of protection.
If courts have failed, then it is time to turn to other institutions; it
is time to consider something more than judicial review as the only
way that courts provoke consideration of equality norms. Class
legislation was not simply a different idea of equality; it assumed a

legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires,” id.
at 17–18.
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different idea of where inequality was most likely to be prevented—in
the legislative process. Perhaps it is time that courts turned the
question back to the legislature and exerted a form of equality
abstention that forces legislatures to ask whether the majority has
fulfilled its representational duties to the minority. The Supreme
Court has always been leery of deciding matters of equality that
depend on effects rather than intent, but this is all the more reason
for the Court to place the burden on those who are responsible for
the creation and the effects of legislation. This, and only this, would
be a real theory of class legislation.

